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NOTES
PROTECTING THE LOW INCOME CONSUMER.
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS REVISITED
After visiting in the far off land of Houyhnhnms, a noted traveler
was once heard to remark:
It is a Maxim among these Lawyers, that whatever hath been done
before, may legally be done again: And therefore they take spe-
cial Care to record all the Decisions formerlly made against com-
mon Justice and the general Reason of Mankind. These, under
the Name of Precedents, they produce as Authorities to justify the
most iniquitous Opimons; and the Judges never fail of decreeing
accordingly 1
Perhaps Swift's reference to the English common law was simply too
vague, for alas, only a deaf ear was turned. Precedents can, and do in
many instances, have the effect of simply ratifying, and thereby ex-
panding upon, existing inequalities. Nowhere has that been more
apparent than in the relationship of debtor and creditor, or more spe-
cifically in the field of creditors' remedies.2 It is indeed anomalous that
m a nation whose economic vitality is dependent upon an expanding
volume of consumer spending,3 there has been little regard for the
1. J. SwiFt, GuLtiv's TRAvElS, (P Turner ed. 1971).
2. The origins of attachment as a remedy can be traced to the 13th century. It was
not a collection remedy, but merely a means used under common law "mesne" process
to compel the appearance of defendants named in personal actions. Since default
judgments were not recognized until 1725, his appearance was necessary for the plaintiff
to obtain satisfaction. If he did not appear it was considered a breach of the "King's
Peace" and the goods were forfeited. Later the remedy was expanded to permut a
creditor, whose debtor could not be found, to attach the debtor's goods, or the debts
owed him in satisfaction of hIs claim.
This method of "foreign attachment" came to America virtually intact. Sometime
during the 17th and 18th centuries, the colonies expanded the remedy further by enabling
creditors to reach the assets of resident debtors about to flee the jurisdiction. Under
such circumstances the remedy seemed to have purely a security function. See
R. MILLAR, CIVIL PROCEDURE OF Tim TRIAL CouRT IN HISTORICAL PERSPEcTIVE 74, 361
(1952); S. RIESENFELD, CREDIToRs' REMEDiEs AND DEBTORS' PROTECTON 177-78 (1967).
3. Consumer debt outstanding was estimated at $122.5 billion in 1970. N. Y. Times,
Feb. 4, 1970 at 55, col. 1. By 1971, it had increased to an estimated $125 billion. 57 FED.
REs. BULL. A54 (1971).
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legdl rights of the consumer. The law has been the law of the creditor, 4
and as such, the remedies for the protection of his property have pro-
liferated with almost total disregard for resulting hardships upon the
consumer-debtor.5
"Consumers, by definition, include us all. "7 6 But it is the impov-
erished consumer who has been most drastically affected by the lack
of response or concern from the legal system. Generally, the law pre-
supposes a consumer equipped to deal with the business community
on at least equal terms. Whatever its validity for the middle class, this
supposition is inapplicable to most of the dealings of the poor.7 A more
accurate picture of the low income consumer is one of a non-mobile,
uninformed and totally unsophisticated purchaser who is frequently
caught m a whirlpool of high prices, high credit charges, and an even
4. This phenomenon can be explained by considering the attorney as a commodity
which will go to that person who pays the highest price. In so regarding the profession,
one commentator has said: "There is an old and trite saying that 'He who pays the
piper calls the tune.' The problem with the law establishment is that the piper is paid
by industry, and is best paid by large units of industry" Leary, Random Reflections on
Remedies and Collections in the Consumer Credit Field, 19 AM. U.L. REv. 189, 191,
(1970). Another commentator has observed: "The concerns and responses of the legal
profession are reflected m the law schools. As long as corporations are the highest bidders
for legal talent, the principal product of the law school will remain, the lawyer who
can best fulfill the needs of the corporate world." D. Rockwell, The Education of the
Capitalist Lawyer" The Law School, in LAW AGAINSr THE PEOPLE 91 (1971).
5. See, e.g., Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94 (1921), in which the Supreme Court
held:
The division of our extended domain into many different States,
taken in connection with the universal and unexampled expansion of credit,
and the prevalent abolishment of imprisonment for debt; would naturally,
and of necessity, lead to the establishment, and, as experience has demon-
strated, the enlargement and extension, of remedies acting upon the property
of debtors.
id. at 104, quoting C. DRAKE, SuiTs By ATTAcHMENT IN TIE UNITED STATES § 3, at 3
(6th ed. 1885).
6. 108 CONG. REc. 4167, 4263 (1962) (mesage from President Kennedy to congress
concermng the strength of programs to protect consumer interests) The message
continues "[Tihey are the largest econormc group in the economy, affecting and
affected by almost every public and private economic decision. Two-thirds of all
spending in the economy is by consumers. But they are the only important group in
the economy who are not effectively organized, whose views are often not heard. "
7. One of the most frequent complaints of consumer advocates is the failure of
existing statutes to protect the low income consumer: "In most states, the laws govern-
Ing relations between consumers and merchants in effect offer protection only to
mformed, sophisticated parties with understanding of each other's rights and obligations.
Consequently, these laws are little suited to protect the rights of most low-income
consumers." REPORT OF Thm NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CivIL DISORDERS 139
(1968).
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higher resulting debt.8 His inability to pay, for whatever reason,
coupled with an understandable distrust of the entire judicial system,
has the effect of making the provisional remedy an indiscriminate stamp
for all creditor claims against the poor.' Only recently has the legal
system reacted to the reality of modem consumer-creditor relationships;
as the abuses and inequities inherent in summary procedures became
more apparent,'0 the legal profession could no longer maintain its in-
transigent position. Consequently, the entire spectrum of provisional
creditor's remedies" has been subjected to renewed constitutional scrut-
iny. Under the guise of procedural due process, the Supreme Court
8. During Hearings on H.R. 11601 Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Affairs of the
House Committee on Banking and Currency, 90th Cong., ist Sess., 665 (1967) David
Caplovitz remarked: "The poor, more than any other group in society are victims
of abuses arising from consumer credit. They are- particularly prone to exploitation
by unscrupulous credit merchants who operate with virtual anonymity as a result of
loopholes in current legislation and the absence of enforcement machinery" See gen-
erally, D. CAPLovrrz, THE POOR PAY MoRE (1967); Note, Abuse of Process; Sewer
Service, 3 COLUM. LAW & Soc. PRoB. 17 (1967); Note, Wage Garnishment in Wash-
ington-An Empirical Study, 43 WASH. L. REv. 743 (1968); Note, Wage Garnishment
as a Collection Device, 1967 Wis. L. RFv. 759.
9. The development of the various provisional remedies has brought about a signifi-
cant change in the nature and function of the collection process.
"[I]t is probably a fair estimate that in a substantial proportion of the cases in which
attachment or garnishment procedures are used the principal judgment is rendered by
default and becomes a mere formality In this sense one rmght say that the provisional
remedy (especially in the garnishment of wages) is now frequently used as a substitute
for complete adjudication." Note, Provisional Remedies in New York Reappraised Under
Smadacb v. Family Finance Corp.. A Constitutional Fly in the Creditor's Ointment, 34 &
ALBA.NY L. Rv. 426, 428 (1970), citing Peterson, Some Observations on Provisional Relief
m American Law, 14 AM. J. Comp. L. 266, 267-68 (1965).
10. This imbalance, condoned to a large extent, and ignored to a greater extent by
the courts, contributed to the "frustrations and failure" that pervaded the core of this
nation's cities, and led eventually to the total breakdown of the legal system in the
riots which erupted in Harlem, Chicago and Philadelphia in 1964, Watts in 1965, and
dozens of other cities in the years that followed. REPORT oF Tim NATIONAL ADvisoaY
COMMISSION ON Cvnr DISORDERS 2 (1968). These civil disturbances were characterized
by a strilng out at " those people or institutions that the rioters thought of
as being their principal oppressors: policemen and white passers-by, or white-owned
commercial establishments, especially those that charged high prices, dealt in inferior
merchandise or employed harsh credit policies. Loan offices were, a favorite target."
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAw ENFORCEMENT ANmD ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTIcE, THE
CAALLENGE OF CaIME IN A FREE SocIETY 37 (1967).
-11. While provisional creditor's remedies vary in form and substance from state to
state, they are generally defined as a "remedy provided for present need [as] a
temporary process which secures him against loss, irreparable injury, dissipation of
the property, etc., while the action is pending." Brci's LAW DICTIONARY 1389 (rev.
4th ed. 1968).
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has upheld limitations on the use of confessed judgments, 2 prejudg-
ment wage garmshment,:" and statutory replevin, 4 while other proce-
dures, once believed sacrosanct, are encountering persistent challenge in
the lower courts. Although the results have not been uniform, due
process fatalities include attachment, 5 seizure of a boarder's personalty
under an innkeeper's lien,' 6 landlord's distraint for rent, 7 repossession
of residence,' 8 and required prior payment of rent as a condition prece-
dent to a proffered defense.'
The deluge of litigation, precipitated by the Court's holding in
Smadach v. Family Finance Corp.20 has focused attention on the hard-
ships and injustices2' resulting from misuse of the legal process.22 How-
ever, it appears that under a system which has for so long condoned
such abuses, it might be "business as usual" despite the mandates of the
courts. Stated somewhat differently, it is questionable whether the due
process guarantees of Smadacb and its progeny will afford debtors any
more real protection from sharp legal and business practices than
existed previously
The answer will depend in part on the willingness of courts to per-
mt a narrow technical compliance with constitutional requirements
instead of focusing upon the substance of the abuse. Allowing waivers
of these constitutional rights, for example, would have the effect of
eviscerating any protection which due process guarantees otherwise
would afford. It should be further acknowledged that the right to prior
12. Swarb v. Lennox, 92 S. Ct. 767 (1972). Compare D. H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co,
/92 S. Ct. 775 (1972), 'with its companion case, Swarb.
13. Smadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
14. Fuentes v. Shevin, 92 S.Ct. 1983 (1972). For state courts which have held in
accordance with Fuentes see, Laprease v. Raymours Furniture Co., 315 F Supp. 716
(N.D.N.Y. 1970) (applying New York law); Blair v. Pitchess, 5 Cal. 3d 258, 486 P.2d
1242, 96 Cal. Rptr. 42 (1971).
15. Termplan, Inc. v. Sup. Ct., 105 Ariz. 270, 463 P.2d 68 (1969); Randone v. Appellate
Dep't of Super. Ct, 5 Cal. 3d 536, 488 P.2d 13, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709 (1971).
16. Klin v. Jones, 315 F Supp. 109 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
17. Santiago v. McElroy, 319 F Supp. 284 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
18. Mihans v. Municipal Ct., 7 Cal. App. 3d 479, 87 Cal. Rptr. 17 (Ct. App. 1970)
19. Amanuensis Ltd. v. Brown, 65 Misc. 2d 15, 318 N.Y.S.2d II (Civ. Ct. 1971).
20. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
21. The judicial rhetoric concerning such abuses is viewed by some commentators as
a reemergence of the doctrine of substantive due process. See, e.g., Graham, Poverty and
Substantive Due Process, 12 Amuz. L. REv. 1 (1970); Growth of Procedural Due Process,
66 Nw U.L. REv. 1 (1971). See also Smadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 344
(1969) (Black, J. dissenting).
22. Santiago v. McElroy, 319 F Supp. 284 (E.D. Pa. 1970); Swarb. v. Lennox, 314
F. Supp. 1091, 1097-98 (E.D. Pa. 1970); Atlas Credit Corp. v. Ezrine, 25 N.Y.2d 219, 230,
250 N.E.2d 474, 481, 303 N.Y.S.2d 382, 391 (1969).
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notice and a hearing will be of little worth to one -who, for financial
or other reasons, is unable to assert it. By placing a burden upon indi-
gents (or middle-class consumers) to defend their interests in court,
these safeguards against economic oppression will be diluted by the
probability of default judgments, the necessity of proceeding on a case
by case basis, and the lack of real protection. This Note will analyze
the recent expansion of due process into the field of creditors' remedies.
It will examine the reasons for this development and its likely effect
in terms of debtor and consumer protection.
CHANGING CONCEPTS OF DUE PROCESS
Full understanding of a due process analysis of the debtor-creditor
relationship requires some historical orientation. Traditionally, the due
process provisions of the fifth and fourteenth amendments have been
narrowly construed. As a result, aggrieved debtors have not been
afforded protection from provisional creditors' remedies. In the 1920's,
for example, the Supreme Court in three separate opinions summarily
rejected the argument that prejudgment attachment results in a denial
of due process. 23 Even as late as 1950, the Court held that "[iut is suffi-
cient, where only property rights are concerned, that there is at some
stage an opportunity for a hearing and judicial determination." 24
Clearly, then, it came as somewhat of a surprise when the Supreme
Court, on due process grounds, invalidated a Wisconsin statute author-
izing ex parte seizure of an alleged'debtor's wages in the case of Sntadach
v. Family Finance Corpi25
In Smadach, a finance company, acting in accordance with Wisconsin
law, 2  had initiated garnishment proceedings in the Circuit Court for
Milwaukee County against the debtor, Christine Smadach, and 'her
employer as garnishee, alleging an indebtedness of $420 on a promis-
sory note.27 In conformity with established statutory procedure2s the
23. McKay v. McInnes, 279 U.S. 820 (1929); Coffin Bros. v. Bennet, 277 U.S. 29
(I928); Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94 (1921).
24. Ewing v. Mynnger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594, 599 (1950).
25. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
26. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 267.01-.24 (Supp. 1969). Counsel for the petitioner in Snadacb
listed 16 other states, having statutory schemes similar to Wisconsin. Included were:
Alaska, Arkansas, Arizona, California, Idaho, Iowa, Minnesota, Montana, New Hamp-
shire, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, Utah, Vermont, Washington, and Wyoming.
I CCH POVERTY LAW REP. 129.751 (1972).
27. The Wisconsin garnishment law furnished a device which the creditor could
implement against any person m possession of his debtor's property Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 267.01 (Supp. 1969). Moreover, the procedure was available to the creditor after
1972]
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garnishee-employer answered, admitting that he was indebted to Mrs.
Smadach for one week's wages, that he would pay her one-half of
that amount as a subsistence allowance,29 and that the remaining one-
half would be withheld pending an order of the court 0
Mrs. Smadach moved for dismissal of the garnishment proceedings,
alleging that the Wisconsin procedure violated her right to due process
of law as guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment 1 by failing to
provide her with notice3 2 and an opportunity to be heard prior to the
seizure of her wages.3 The Milwaukee County Court rejected that
contention and held the procedure to be constitutional; the Wisconsin
Supreme Court affirmed. 4 The United States Supreme Court reversed,
commencement of the principal action whether or not it had proceeded to judgment.
Id. 5 267.05 (1).
28. Id. § 267.11 (6).
29. Id. § 267.18 (2) (a) provides:
When wages or salary are the subject of garnishment action, the garnishee
shall pay over to the principal defendant on the date when such wages or
salary would normally be payable a subsistence allowance, out of the
wages or salary then owing, in the sum of $25 in the case of an individual
without dependants or $40 in the case of an individual with dependants;
but m no event in excess of 50 per cent of the wages or salary owing. Said
subsistence allowance shall be applied to the first wages or salary earned
in the period subject to said garnishment action.
30. The statute inposed upon the garnishee an affirmative duty to retain the debtor's
property until final adjudication of the claim. Id. § 267.04. Furthermore the garnishee was
held liable for the amount of indebtedness if he did not retain the debtor's property
Id. § 267.18 (1).
31. US. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1: "[Nlor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law. " Mrs. Smadach also argued that
Wisconsin denies equal protection to persons of low income by permitting garnished
defendants to post bond and thus secure the release of garnished property (WIs. STAT.
ANN. § 267.2 (Supp. 1969). However, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that since
she had failed to show she was unable to post 'such bond, she lacked the requisite
standing to make the argument.
Although petitioner was apparently deemed to have standing to argue that the pre-
judgment garnishment procedure demes equal protection by imposing a "harsher sum-
mary process" on wage earners than on other debtors, the court found that petitioner
had failed to set forth with sufficient specificity how the statutory pattern as "applied
to her own particular situation," abridged the constitutional guarantee. Family Finance
Corp. v. Snmadach, 37 Wis. 2d 163, 177, 154 N.W.2d 259, 267 (1969).
32. The defendant did receive notice of the garnishment of her wages on the same
day they were seized. However, the Wisconsin statute did not require such prompt
action. The statute allowed the garmshor to wait as long as ten days after serving the
employer before notifying the debtor of the garnishment. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 267.07
(Supp. 1969).
33. The debtor was not permitted to challenge the merits of the garnishment until
the adjudication of the principal action. Id. § 267.16 (1).
34. Family Finance Corp. v. Smadach, 37 Wis. 2d 163 154 N.W.2d 259 (1967). The
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holding that the "interim freezing of wages" without notice and the
opportunity to be heard was a violation of procedural due process. 5
It is impossible to define with any specificity what constitutes pro-
cedural due process. 6 It seems, however, that "at a mmimum [the due
process clause] require[s] that deprivation of life, liberty or property
by adjudication be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing
appropriate to the nature of the case.- -?T-he-Court, speaking through
Justice Douglas, recognized this, ight to be heard" as a right consti-
tutionally protected. However, it coulihardly ignore a number of its
prior rulings which had upheld E6ndina-lm_ re-judgment deprivations
of constitutionally protected rights pen ing the outcome of the case. 8
court reasoned that the prejudgment garnishment procedure did "not involve any final
determination of the title to a defendant's property, but merely preserve[d] the status
quo thereof pending determination of the principal action. The defendant receives
notice and a hearing before being permanently deprived of his or her property." 37
Wis. 2d at 169, 154 N.W 2d at 262.
35. 395 US. 337 (1969). Justice Black argued in dissent that Mrs. Suadach did not
possess the requisite standing to challenge the statute since she had been notified of
the garnishment on the day it was commenced and had been afforded a 'hearmg on
her order to show cause. Id. at 346.
36. See, e.g., Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 173 (1952)- "Due process of law, as
a historic and generative principle, precludes defining, and thereby confining. ."
37. Mullane v. Central Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950) (emphasis added).
The rationale behind affording an opportunity to be heard is that adjudicative facts-
facts pertammg to a particular party-normally ought not to be found without allowing
him to explain and cross-examine. The foundations of this requirement were laid in
Baldwin v. Hale, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 223 (1863) where the Court held that a discharge
under state insolvency law was ineffective against a nonresident creditor:
'Partes whose rights are to be affected are entitled to be heard; in order that they
may enjoy that right they must first be notified. Common justice requires that no
man shall be condemned in his person or property without nonce and an opportunity
to make his defense." 68 U.S. (1 Wall) at 233.
Since that time this proposition has been frequently reiterated by the Court. See
Holt v. Virginia, 381 US. 131 (1965); Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 US. 545 (1965); Best
v. Humboldt Placer Mining Co., 371 US. 334 (1963); Anderson Nat'l Bank v. Luckett,
321 US. 233 (1944); Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940); Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v.
State Bd. of Equalization, 239 US. 441 (1915); Grannis v. Ordean, 234 US. 385 (1914);
Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908).
38. Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers, Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961);
Zittman v. McGrath, 341 US. 446 (1951); Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339
US. 594 (1950); Fahey v. Mallonee,-332 U.S. 245 (1947); Huron Holding Corp. v.
Lincoln Mine Operating Co, 312 U.S. 183 (1941); Rorick v. Devon Syndicate, Ltd,
307 U.S. 299 (1939); Sanders v. Amour Fertilizer Works, 292 U.S. 190 (1934);
Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589 (1931); McKay v. McInnes, 279 US. 820 (1929);
Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 US. 94 (1921);. Clark v. Wells, 203 US. 164 (1906); Louisville
&.Nashville R.R. v. Deer, 200 US. 176 (1906); Harris v. Balk, 198 US. 215 (1905);
Rothschild v. Knight, 184 U.S. 334 (1902); King v. Cross, 175 US. 396 (1899); Chicago,
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Thus, the Court refrained from asserting an absolute proposition that
every interference with the property of a debtor prior to judgment
would constitute a deprivation without due process of law Instead it
held that "[s]uch summary procedure may well meet the requirements
of due process in extraordinary situations.39
Scope of Due Process-Extraordinary Situattons
Although "extraordinary situations" cannot be narrowly defined,40
three of the decisions cited by the Court give some indication of the
type of countervailing interests which would outweigh the right to
be heard prior to a seizure. The citation of Fahey v. Mallonee41 and
Ewing v. Mytrnger & Casselberry, Inc. 2 seems clearly to indicate
approval of the doctrine that there might be a conditional seizure of
property pending the outcome of the case in order to protect some
compelling governmental interest.43 In Ewing the Supreme Court upheld
the constitutionality of a provision of a federal statute44 which author-
ized seizure by the administrator of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cos-
metic Act of all "misbranded" articles which he had "probable cause"
to believe were dangerous to health, fraudulently mislabeled, or ma-
terially misleading. The Court reasoned:
One of the oldest examples [of pre-judgment seizure without an
opportunity to be heard] is the summary destruction of property
RI. & Pac. Ry. v. Sturm, 174 U.S. 710 (1899); Springer v. Umted States, 102 U.S.
586 (1880); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877); Cooper v. Reynolds, 77 U.S. (10
Wall.) 308 (1870); Brashear v. West, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 608, 617-24 (1870); Standard Oil
Co. v. Superior Ct., 44 Del. 538, 62 A.2d 454 (1948), appeal dismtssed for 'want of
substantal federal question, 336 U.S. 930 (1949)
39. 395 US. at 339 (emphasis supplied)
40. The use of such a nebulous term connotes a certain degree of indefiniteness. The
law govermng the requirements of due process is largely judge-made, and the lack
of exactitude allows for' a subjective analysis by the court under the facts and circum-
stances of each case.
41. 332 U.S. 245 (1947).
42. 339 U.S. 594 (1950).
43. See also Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers, Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886
(1961) (protection of national security); !Yakus v. Umted States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944)
(maintenance of economic stability); Phillips v.-ommis.oer, 283 U.S. 589 (1931)
(collection of taxes); North American Cold Storage Co. v. City of Chicago, 211 U.S.
306 (1908) (public health); Scottish Union & Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Bowland 196 US. 611
(1905) (protection of public welfare and continued existence of government through
collection of taxes); Springer v. United States, 102 U.S. 586 (1880) (protection of
public welfare and continued existence of government through collection of taxes).
44. Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act of 1938, ch. 675, § 304(a), 52 Stat. 1044,
as amended, 21 U.S.C. § 334(a) (Supp. IV, 1965-69).
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without prior notice or hearing for the protection of public health.
There is no constitutional reason why Congress in the interests of
consumer protection may not extend that area of control.45
Fahey dealt with the power of the Federal Home Loan Bank to vest
in a conservator authority to summarily seize the assets of a savings
and loan association whose operation it deemed injurious to the interests
of depositors, creditors and the public.46 The Court recognized that
this procedure was a drastic one:
But the delicate nature of the institution and the possibility of
preserving credit during an investigation [has made such a pro-
cedure necessary]. It is a heavy responsibility to be exercised
with disinterestedness and restraint, but in the light of the his-
tory and customs of banking we cannot say it is unconstitutional.47
The decision in Coffin Bros. Co. v. Bennett4 8 can be explained on
similar grounds. There the Court upheld a Georgia statute" authorizing
the Superintendent of Banks to attach the property of a stockholder of
a defunct bank, against whom an assessment of 100 per cent stock-
holder's liability had been made. The procedure was justified by the
necessity of upholding public confidence m the banking system.50
In each of these cases, it can be argued that three factors coalesced
to compel a finding that the seizures were constitutionally valid. First,
the seizures were undertaken on behalf of the public at large rather
than for the benefit of a single class of individuals. Second, the seizure
could be initiated only by an authorized government official. And
third, in each case immediate action was necessary in order to avoid
potential serious harm to the general public.51
45. 339 US. at 599-600.
46. Home Owners Loan Act of 1933, ch.. 64, S 5(d), 48 Stat. 132, as amended, 12
U.S.C. § 1464(d) (1964).
47. 332 U.S. at 253-54.
48. 277 US. 29 (1928).
49. 12 PARi's ANw. CoDE § 2268(t) (1925).
50. This decision wag rendered during the depression era at a tme when public
confidence m the banking system was on the wane. Maintenance of that confidence
was a prime governmental concern.
In Coffin Bros. the Court summarily rejected the argument that prejudgment attach-
ment results in a demal of due process. Justice Holmes, writing for the majority, noted
that "nothing is more common than to allow parties alleging themselves to be creditors
to establish in advance by attachment a lien dependent for its effect upon the result of
the smt' 277 U.S. at 3 1,
51. Fuentes v. Shevin, 92 S. Ct. 1983, 2000 (1972). Randone v. Appellate Dep't of
19721]
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Had the Court cited only these three decisions the "extraordinary
situation" could be more easily delineated. However, reference was
also made to O'wnbey v. Morgan52 That case involved a challenge to
a Delaware foreign attachment statute authorizing the court in which
the proceeding was pending to deny the defendant an opportunity to
appear unless he first posted security in an amount equal to the value of
the attached property The Supreme Court refused to declare the
statute unconstitutional, stating-
The due process clause does not impose upon the States a duty
to establish-ideal systems for the administration of justice. But
a property owner who absents himself from the territorial juris-
diction of a State, leaving his property within it, must be deemed
ex necessitate to consent that the State may subject such property
to judicial process to answer demands made against him in his
absence, according to any practicable method that reasonably may
be adopted.53
The apparent justification for the holding was the need to provide
security for the satisfaction of debts owed by non-resident defendants . 4
Conspicuously absent was any impending threat to the general welfare
or a benefit secured for a group larger than a single class of individuals.
The inference to be drawn from the Court's citation of Ovmbey is
that the use of pre-judgment attachment will not constitute a denial
of due process when utilized as a basis for quasi-in-rem jurisdiction.55
Super. Ct., 5 Cal. 3d 536, 556-57, 488 P.2d 13, 26, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709, 722 (1971). See
also Comment, The Constitutional Validity of Attachment in Light of Smadach v.
Family Finance Corp., 17 U.C.L.AJL. Rev. 837, 841-43 (1970)
52. 256 U.S. 94 (1921).
53. Id. at 110-11.
54. See Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215 (1905); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877)
See also Byrd v. Rector, 112 W Va. 192, 163 S.E. 845 (1932). This case also involved
attachment -of a nonresident's property;, it- was relied on by Mr. Justice Black in his
dissent in Smadach as a general approval of all attachments.
55. Fuentes v. Shevin, 92 S. Ct. at 1999-2000 n.23.
"A court by proper service of process may acquire jurisdiction to determine interests
in things within the State, even though the persons affected thereby are not subject
to the power of the- State." RESTATEMENT oF JUDGMENTS § 32 (1942).
There are two types of proceedings which fall within the scope of this principle: (1)
proceedings to protect interests in property, and (2) proceedings to apply property to
the payment of claims. Where the plaintiff claims against all the world the action is
in rem; where enforcement is sought against designated persons only, the proceeding
is quasi in rem. In the latter case, plaintiff claims no interest in the property itself,
but seeks to enforce a claim against the defendant by applying his property to the
satisfaction of the claim. See RESTATEmENT Or JUDGMENTs, Introductory Note, & §§ 2, 3,
32-37, 73-76 (1942).
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The absence of the debtor from-the forum state should not be the limit
of judicial inquiry, however; that circumstance alone is not necessarily
determinative of the risk and hardship factors which must be balanced
m every instance.5 6  Foreign attachment, for example, may create a
special evil of its own when employed as a means to evade the exemp-
tion statutes provided in the wage earner's home state.57
By examining the opinions of both Justice Douglas speaking for the
majority, and Justice Harlan concurring, it is possible to reach a sub-
stantially different conclusion as to the position of the Court in citing
Ownbey After referring to that decision the Smadach majority opinion
continues:
But m the present case no situation requiring special protection to
a state or creditor interest is presented by the facts; nor is the
Wisconsin statute narrowly drawn to meet any such unusual con-
dition. Petitioner was a resident of thus Wisconsin community and
in personam jurisdiction was readily obtainable.58
Justice Douglas thus seems to suggest that where in personam juris-
dictAon is readily obtainable 9 there is no situation requiring special
56. See Kennedy, Due Process Lrmitations on Creditor's Remedies: Some Reflections
on Smadacb v. Family Finance Corp, 19 AM. U,. REv. 158, 160-63 (1970).
If the intention of the Sniadacb court was to protect a specialized form of property
essential to day-to-day existence, it can be argued that deprivation of a debtor's property
which is located in another jurisdiction is less likely to cause an extreme hardship. This
logic, however, does not apply to the foreign attachment of wages.
Furthermore, if the court is simply balancing the interests of the individual debtor
against the governmental or creditor interest it would seem that no differentiation
should be made between a resident and a non-resident debtor.
57. See, e.g., Chicago B. & Q. R.R. v. Hall, 229 US. 511 (1913); Chicago, R.1. & Pac.
Ry v. Sturm, 174 U.S. 710 (1899); Halls Clothing Co. v. Ramirez, 184 S.W.2d 296
(Tex. Civ. App. 1944). See also Tucker v. Burton, 319 F Supp. 567 (D.D.C. 1970);
Mills v. Bartlett, 265 A.2d 39 (Del. Super. 1970); City Finance Co. of Mount Raier,
Inc. v. Williams, 2 CCH PovERTY LAw REP. 10,388 (D.C. Ct. Gen. Sess. 1969).
Since the benefit of exemptions conventionally is restricted to residents of the
state creating them, garnishment of an employer outside the debtor's state has often
enabled the creditor to escape the limitations on his recovery imposed by the exemption
law of the debtor states. To prevent evasion of local exemption laws in this manner a
number of states have passed legislation prohibiting local creditors from causing, either
directly or by assignment of their claims, the out-of-state garnishment of wages (or other
exempt claims) of resident debtors. See, e.g., IND. ANN. STAT. 10-4094 (1956); NE. REv.
STAT. § 25-1560 to 1563 (1964); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 26-2-36 (1953), repealed ch. 96,
S 10-102 (1971). See also S. REsENF-r, CREiroRS' REMDEms AND DEnToR's PROTECTION
337-38 (1968)
58. 395 U.S. at 339.
59. See, Carrington, The Modern Utility of Quasi rn Rem Jurisdiction, 76 HtAv. L.
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protection to a state or creditor interest.60  Any other interpr&ation
would ignore Justice Douglas' last sentence and thus distort the totality
of his statement.
This conclusion finds support in the concurring opinion of Justice
Harlan, which makes no reference to O'wnbey, but which mstead ob-
serves that:
due process is afforded only by the kinds of "notice" and
"hearing" which are aimed at establishing the validity, or at least
the probable validity, of the underlying claim against the alleged
debtor before he can be deprived of his property or its unrestricted
use. [T] his is the thrust of the past cases in this Court.61
Thus it seems clear that the continued vitality of a prejudgment seizure
REv. 303 (1962), in which the author notes that long arm statutes make personal
jurisdiction readily available in cases where the non-resident defendant has sufficient
contacts with the forum state to create a genuine state interest. Thus, the author argues
that quasi in rem jurisdiction which can be established by prejudgment foreign attach-
ment is likely to be used only when the state has no legitimate interest in the suit.
"[Alt [the] most, the suggestion argues only for quasi in rem commencement condi-
tioned upon a showing by the plaintiff that such an exercise of jurisdiction is necessary
to avoid unnecessary litigation or absconding." Id. at 308.
60. Judge Skelly Wright made a similar argument in Tucker v. Burton, 319 F Stipp.
'567 (.D.C. 1970). In that case an installment sales contract had been executed in the
District of Columbia between a D.C. corporation and a resident' of Maryland who
worked in D.C., with the vendor assigning the contract to a Maryland corporation.
Taking advantage of the foreign prejudgement statute [D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-501 (1967)]
the Maryland corporation brought an action in the D.C. courts to gariish the wages of
the Maryland 'employee. Judge Wright argued that while cases such as Ow'nbey
endorsed the right of a state to protect itself against the attempts of non-residents to
escape obligations owed to its own citizens, the instant case was not of that kind.
Since in personam jurisdiction was readily available, Smadach would require a prior
hearing before seizure. IPe aid:
Due process must deal in realities, not rules. And what is absolutely
clear from a reading of Outmbey and Smadach is that "non-residency" will
be a factor justifying a rule of summary procedure only insofar as it is
a reliable indicator that the debtor may otherwise be able to escape his
legal obligations. The reality which creates an "extraordinary situation"
and which justifies the summary procedure of prejudgement garnishment
is the unavailability of the ddbtor for personal services
319 F Supp. at 557 The majority of the court, however, held that a procedure per-
mtting prejudgment attachment of a ribn-resident's wages is valid as a statute narrowly
dawn to meet an "unusual condition." Id. at 569. But see Mills v. Barlett, 265 A.2d '39
(Del. Super. 1970) in which the Delaware Superior Court struck down its foreign
prejudgment garnishment law. See generally Note, Constitutional Law-Due Process-
Prior Hearing in Wage Garnisbment, 1970 Wis. L. REv. 181, 190.
1 61. 395 U.S. at 343.
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in the quasi-m-rem situation 2 is questionable. This view appears to.have
found acceptance in many jurisdictions which restrict the use of pre-
judgment attachment to instances where fraudulent conduct by the
defendant can be shown.63
Balancing Approach
Implicit in Justice Douglas' recognition of the "extraordinary situ-
ation" is his approval of a balancing test to determine whether there
has been a deprivation of a constitutionally protected right.64 Essen-
tally, due process requires nothing less. Previously, when the necessity
of a hearing has been questioned 65 courts have utilized a procedure
which involved consideration of
[t]he precise nature of the interest that has been adversely af-
fected, the manner in which this was done, the reasons for doing
it, the available alternatives to the procedure that was followed
. the balance of hurt complained of and good accom-
plished 66
62. See Kennedy, supra note 56, at 162.
63. See, e.g., VA. CoDE ANN. § 8-520 (Supp. 1970); PA. R. Crv. P. 1286.
64. One commentator feels that the Court was not balancing at all. Note, Garnish-
ment of Wages Prior to Judgement Is a Denial of Due Process: The Smadach Case and
Its Implications For Related Areas of the Law, 68 MicH. L. REV. 986, 994-96 (1970).
Rather, it is argued that the Court focused entirely on the individual's interest in obtamn-
mg the wages without delay and ignored the public interests favoring prejudgment wage
garnishment. The Court thus failed to articulate fuolly the theoretical bases for its de-
cision. Id. at 994-95.
Although the decision failed to elucidate what mterestg were being weighed, or that
it was balancing at all, this can be attributed in part to Mr. Justice Douglas' "relative
unconcern for doctrinal explanation and by his willingness to let tactical considerations
shape his doctrinal pronouncements" Karst, Inmndious Discrimnation: justice Douglas
And the Return of the "Natural-Law-Due Process Formula", 16 U.C.L.L. REV. 716,
718 (1969).
65. In those cases which have questioned the requirement of a hearing, the determina-
rive issue has usually been whether there was a deprivation of a constitutionally protected
right. This was clearly the case in Smnadacb: "In this case the sole question is whether
there has been a taking of property without the procedural due process that is required
by the Fourteenth Amendment." 395 U.S. at 339. See also, Cafeteria & Restaurant
Workers, Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961); Flemnung v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603
(1960); Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc, 359 U.S. 594 (1950); McKay v. McInnes,
279 US. 820 (1929); English v. English, 117 So. 2d 559 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1960); Siegall v.
Solomon, 19 Ill. 2d 45, 166 N.E.2d 5 (1960).
66. Joint Anti-Fascist Comm. v. McGrath, 341 US. 123, 163 (1951) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring). See, e.g., Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 14 (1965) ('The requirements of
due process are a function not only of the extent of the governmental restriction n-
posed, but also of the extent of the necessity for the restriction."); Frank v. Maryland,
1972]
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The notion that "fundamental fairness" must be accorded the parties
permeates these cases; a determination of what is "fundamentally fair"
inevitably involves a weighing and balancing of the litigants' interests.
Smadach did not enunciate an erosion of this rule.6 7
What, then, was the Court attempting to establish? Traditionally,
courts have considered the public interest in ensuring the collectability
of debts superior to the interests of the debtor.6" By securing execution
in advance of judgment, and freezing the property pending the outcome
of the case, the debtor is prevented from dissipating the fund which may
ultimately be used to satisfy the debt.6 9 Certainly there is an enormous
creditor interest in this policy Equally certain are the many instances
where the protection of this interest is bona fide.
The Court, however, dismisses these interests in a cursory manner.
Douglas states that "in the present case no situation requiring special
protection to a state or creditor interest is presented by the facts "2 70
In so ruling the Court has implicitly determined that except in "extraor-
dinary situations" a mere creditor interest in the collection of a debt will
not suffice to justify the use of procedures which deprive an individual
of his wages without prior notice and an opportunity to be heard. Ap-
plying this reasoning, garnishment of wages as a prejudgment remedy
has come under the domain of the due process clause.
359 U.S. 360, 363 (1959) ("Application of the broad restraints of due process compels
inquiry into the nature of the demand being made upon individual freedom in a
particular context- and the justification of social need on which the demand rests.");
Wasson v. Trowbridge, 382 F.2d 807, 811 (2d Cir. 1967) ("[To determine in any
given case what procedures due process -requires, the court must carefully determine
and balance the nature of the private interest affected and of thegjy n i nterest
involved. ") See also Hall v. Garson; 430 F.2d 430 (5th Cir. 1970); Santiag6V-'.
McElroy 319 F Supp. 284 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
67. See, e.g., Lebowitz v. Forbes Leasing & Finance Corp., 326 F Supp. 1335 (E.D.
Pa. 1971); Kllm v. Jones, 315 F Supp. 109 (N.D. Cal. 1970); Randone v. Appellate
Dep'r of Super. Ct, 5 Cal. 3d 536, 488 P.2d 13, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709. (1971)
68. See, e.g., McKay v. McInnes, 279. U.S. 820 (1929); Coffin Bros. v. Bennett, 277
U.S. 29 (1928); Ownbey v. Morgan; 256 U.S. 94 (1921); United States Capsule Co. v.
Isaacs, 23 Ind. App. 533, 55 N.E. 832 (1899); St. Johns v. Parsons, 54 Ohio App. 420,
421, 7 N.E.2d 1013, 1014 (1936).
69. It is generally conceded that creditors garnish wages not so much because of the
few dollars per week they can obtain, but because of the leverage it can impose on
the debtor to pay-or refinance the entire debt. See Note, Wage Garnishment in
Wasbington-An Empirical Study, 43 WAsH. L. REv. 743 (1968); Note, Wage Garnish-
ment as a Collection Device, 1967 Wis. L. REv. 759.
Furthermore, in the case of wage garnishment, it seems doubtful that one would
leave his job simply to defraud his creditor and frustrate the garnishment.
70. 395 U.S. at 339.
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This determimation marks a definite departure from the. reasoning
of earlier lower court decisions, which found no deprivation of a con-
stitutionally protected right in the prejudgment garnishment and attach-
ment situations. These earlier decisions involved two similar approaches&
Regarding the- seizure as simply a deprivation of possession, one line of
cases arrived at a very technical result.71 'Possession alone had never
been considered the equivalent of a legal property right; thus, there was
not denial of due process protection. A second approach was utilized
in McKay v. Mclnnes,72 in which the Court recognized the use of prop-
erty as a property right constitutionally protected. However,"it rea-
soned that since attachment concerns only "a conditional an'd temporary
taking [it would not be a] deprivation of property as coitemplated
by the Constitution." " The apparent erosion of this logic is justified
on the basis of changing concepts of property "The fact that a pro-
cedure would pass muster under a feudal regime does -not mean it gives
necessary protection to all property in its modern forms." '4 With
these words the Court abandoned the McKay rationale.75 "We deal
here with wages-a specialized type of property presenting distinct prob-
71. See, e.g., Byrd v..Rector, 112 W Va. 192, 198, 163-S.E. 845, 848 (1932)-'"The most
'that such a procedure does is -to deprive defendant of the possession, of his property
temporarily by establishing a lien thereon. :If, after having ffll opportunity to
be heard in defense of such claim, a judgment is rendered the'reo,. aganst the. de-
-fendant or his property, there has been no lack- of due .process. In the meantime there
has been no deprivation of property. No constitutional right is impaired."
72. 127 Me. 110, 116, 141 A. 699, 702-03 (1928), aff'd per curiam, 279 U.S. 820 (1929).
73. 127 Me. at 116, 141 A. at 702. See also, Shell Oil Co. v. Milne, 246 A.2d 837
(Vt. 1968), in which the court expressly follows the reasoning of both. McKay and
byrd (See note 71 supra).
74. 395 U.S. at 340.
75. The majority opinion in Smadach cited. McKay 'with seeming .approval: "A
procedural rule that may satisfy due process attachments in general does not neces-
sarily satisfy procedural due process in every case." 395 U.S. at 340.
One commentator feels that the Court, by so referring to McKay, has 'ffi med attach-
ment and garnishment in general by creating a presumption in its favor. In Smadacb
they are simply carving out an exception to its principles. Note, Some Implications of
Smadach, 70 COLUM. L. REv. 942, 948 (1970).
However, a substantial number of courts have questioned McKay's continued validity.
See, e.g., Laprease v. Raymours Furniture Co., 315 F Supp. 716 (N.D.N.Y. 1970); Jones
Press, Inc. v. Motor Travel Service, Inc. 286 Minn. 205, 176 N.W.2d 87 (1970).
Justice Harlan rather expllcitly indicated that McKay could not survive the Smadacb
decision: And I-am quite unwilling to take-the unexplicatedper curiam in McKay v,.
Mclnnes as vitating or diluting these essential elements of due process." 395 U.S. at
342 43. .
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lems in our econonc system." 7' The summary seizure of such prop-
erty, even on a temporary basis, entails potentiality for hardship suffi-
cient to make it a "taking" within the meaning of the fourteenth amend-
ment. In order to justify a conclusion which unmistakably contra-
vened the mandates of precedent, the Court in the last five paragraphs
of the opinion described the adverse impact of wage garnishment,7
the abuses inherent in such a procedure, 78 and the mequities therein.79
It concluded:
The result is that a prejudgment garnishment of the Wisconsin
type may as a practical matter drive a wage earning family to
the wall. Where the talng of one's property is so obvious, it
76. 395 U.S. at 340. The most persuasive reason for distinguishing wage garnishment
from other property attachments was presented by Judge Heffernan in his dissent to
the Wisconsin Supreme Court's disposition of Smadach. His opinion pointed out that
although attachment itself is a fairly old remedy, its application to wages of a defendant
is a relatively new practice. He recognized that only since the beginning of the
twentieth century has there been "accrued wages" from which to garnish. Family
Finance Corp. v. Smadach, 37 Wis. 2d 163, 181, 154 N.W.2d 259, 269 (1967) (dissenting
opinion).
77. The court also referred to studies made in various law reviews making this
determination: Brunn, Wage Garnishment in Califorma: A Study and Recommendations,
53 C~A~r. L. REv. 1214 (1965); Note, Wage Garnishment m Washington-An Empirical
Study, 43 WAsH. L. REv. 743 (1968); Note, Wage Garnishment as a Collection Device,
1967 Wis. L. REv. 759.
The consequences a prejudgment seizure could have on a wage earner were set out
as follows:
(1) Garnishment often means loss of job. 395 U.S. at 340.
(2) Prejudgment garnishment of the Wisconsin type may as a practical matter
compel "the wage earner, trying to keep his family together, to be driven below the
poverty level." 395 U.S. at 340, citing 114 CONG. REc. 1832 (1968) (remarks of Congress-
man Reuss).
(3) Garnishment of wages often will entail a loss of essentials, at which point the
debtor has two choices: "He eAther files for consumer bankruptcy, and tries to begin
again, or just quits his job and goes on relief." 395 U.S. at 342 n.9, citing 114 CONG. REc.
1833 (1968) (statement of Congressman Gonzales).
78. Noting the injustices and abuses inherent in a prejudgment garnishment situation
the Court pointed out: "What we know from our study of this problem is that in a
vast number of cases the debt is a fraudulent one, saddled on a poor ignorant person
who is trapped in an easy credit mghtmare, in which he ig charged double for some-
thing he could not pay for even if the proper price was called for, and then hounded
into giving up his pound of flesh. " 395 US. at 341, citing 114 CoNG. Rae. 1832
(1968) (remarks of Congressman Sullivan, Chairman of the House Subcommittee on
Consumer Affairs).
79. The inequities become apparent when one considers the leverage the garmshor-
creditor has over the debtor. See Note, Wage Garnishment in Washington-An Em-
ptrical Study, 45 WA sH. L. Rav. 743 (1968); Note, Wage Garnishment as a Collection
Device, 1967 Wis. L. REV. 759.
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needs no extended argument to conclude that absent notice and
prior hearing this prejudgment garnishment procedure violates
the fundamental principles of due process.8 0
Thus, the temi'prooper'tyas used in the due process clause has been
b:oadened to include theuo _o.wages.8 I Accordingly. any prejudg-
ment garis ment 'wch retards the use of wages without prior notice
and hearing violates due process.8 2
In conclusion, although Smadacb constituted a clear departure from
earlier decisions upholding summary prejudgment attachment and gar-
nishment, this departure ought not to be attributed to perversion of due
process principles. Instead, this change can be-and should be-ex-
plained on the basis of the Court's reevaluation of the potential and
actual effect of prejudgment seizure upon debtors. The hope is that by
providing constitutional protectioni the low income debtor will be
better able to protect himself. The exaggerated ideal which permeates
80. 395 US. at 341-42.
81. Mr. Justice Harlan makes it quite clear what "property" the petitioner was de-
prived of: "[It] is the use of the garnished portion of her wages during the interim
period between garnishment and the culmination of the main suit." Id. at 342. The
recogmtion of the use of property as a property right constitutionally protected is not
entirely new. See Grigg v. Allegheny County, 369 US. 84 (1962) (owner's use of
property protected by fourteenth amendment against state's low flying aircraft); United
States v. Causby, 328 US. 256 (1946) (owner's use of property protected by fifth amend-
ment against government's low flying aircraft over chicken farm); Washington ex rel.
Title Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116 (1928) (owner's use of property protected
by fourteenth amendment against unreasonable zoning restrictions). Smadacb," however,
marks the first time that the Court found due process to require a "prior" hearing
when the restriction on use is relatively brief and an eventual hearing is granted. It
must be noted that in Causby the Court's recognition was only for the purpose of de-
terrmnng damages, and not for the constitutional issue involved.
82. Justice Harlan concluded: "Since this deprivation cannot be characterized as de
mmms, she must be accorded the usual requisites of procedural due process: notice
and a prior hearing." 395 U.S. at 342. Justice Black computed the interest on the
wages withheld, then refused to comment on whether the three dollars was de Mnimus,
but stated that in fact whether or not it was de minmus was immaterial. Id. at 346.
Clearly, however, the use contemplated by the Court is its present enjoyment, or its
utilization through exchange for needed goods and services. One commentator has
pointed out: "To the many families that are dependent upon the immediate use of
wages to buy the staples of everyday life, a temporary 'freezing' of those funds strips
them of much of their value. Loss of the ability to purchase necessities for one week
is not wholly counterbalanced by double buying power in some week thereafter."
Note, Garnishment of Wages Prior to Judgement ss a Dental of Due Process: The
Smadach Case and Its Implications for Related Areas of the Law, 68 MicH. L. Rzv. 986,
995 (1970).
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this logic is that every man stands equal83 at a trial before an impartial
tribunal. It is the hearing itself which can provide some measure of
equality to a relationship which smacks of anything but bargaining
parity 84 And if the policy underlying Sniadacb is to provide some
modicum of protection to those who live on the lower economic margin
of society, it would be illogical for a court to be dissuaded from apply-
Ing that policy by the presence of a contractual term which could force
the debtor to forego that protection. Acceptance of this premise does
not, however, resolve other questions concerning the implications of
Smadacb in the areas of creditor-debtor conflict.
Lizmtatwn on Smadach? Type of Property and Procedure
Prior to Fuentes v. Shevn 85 (which will be considered below) courts
which interpreted Smadacb were unable to agree on the scope of its
mandate. Some looked merely to the procedure involved vis-a-vis
notice and hearing, while others concentrated on the type of property
involved. Thus a number of state courts followed Douglas' distinction
of wages from all other forms of property, thereby refusing to extend
the prohibition of prejudgment attachment of wages to other kinds of
property 86
Other courts have taken a more reasoned approach. In Randone v.
Appellate Dep't of Superior Ct. of Sacramento County,8 7 for example,
a California court held invalid on due process grounds a statute'8 which
83. Such a statement was made in Gideon v. Wainwriaht, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
"From the very beginning, our state and national constitutions and laws have laid
great emphasis on' procedural and substantive safeguards designed to assure fair trils
before impartial tribunals in which every defendant stands equal before the law"
84. The contention is presented herein that the effect of the decision in Smadach was
to render "unconscionable" any clause, either in a contract, or as in this case superim-
posed on a contract by statute, which forces the debtor to forego the right to the
"equality" guarantee of a hearing. See text following note 255 infra. It has been shown
that irreparable harm might well come to a debtor without the protection of a hearing,
while irreparable harm would occur for the creditor only in instances where requiring
nonce and a hearing could diminish the possibility of recovery-or more specifically
those instances referred to. by the court as "extraordinary situations" requiring no right
to a hearing.
"85.' 92 S. Ct. 198 (1972). See pp. 362-65'infra.
86. See, e.g., Termplan, Inc. v. Superior Ct., 105 Ariz. 270, 463 P.2d 68 (1969) (gen-
eral attachment of property); People ex rel. Lynch v. Superior Ct., I Cal. 3d 910,
126, 464 P.2d 126, 83 Cal. Rptr. 670 (1970) (general attachment of property; refusal
to render an advisory opinion.) Johnson v. Cunmngham, 12 Cal. App. 3d 123, 90 Cal.
Rptr. 487 (Ct. App. 1970" (attachment of a debtor's prune crop).
87. 5 Cal. 3d 536, 488 P.2d "13, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709 (1971.).
88. GCAL Civ. PRO. CODE § 537(1) (West 1972).
[Vol. 14:337
CONSUMER DUE PROCESS
permitted the attachment of any property without prior notice and
hearing. Randone, an unemployed workman, had sought a writ of
mandamus in order to dissolve the attachment of his bank account. He
alleged that the money in his account was his only means of survival,
and that a pretrial seizure would deprive him of his constitutional rights.
Relying almost exclusively on Snmadach, the court reasoned:
The private interest of a creditor, even in the special circum-
stances of "absconding" or "concealing assets" does not rise
to the level of an "overwhelming consideration" . so as to
justify a deprivation of such "brutal" dimensions without a prior
hearing on the merits.89
Additionally, where the garnished property consists of welfare benefits
on deposit in a local bank, courts have extended the rationale of
Snadacb in order to prevent a prejudgment garnishment or attach-
mentY0 Confronted with a similar question, the Wisconsin Supreme
Court regarded the holding in Smadacb somewhat differently. In
Larson v. Fetberston9' the court considered whether prejudgment seizure
of two bank accounts totalling over $30,000 was violative of due process.
In this purely commercial context, the court ruled:
Although the majority opinion in Snadach makes considerable
reference to the hardship of the unconstitutional procedure upon
the wage earner, we think that no valid distinction can be made
between garnishment of wages and that of other property Clearly,
a due process violation should not depend upon the type of prop-
erty being subjected to the procedure.92
89. 5 Cal. 3d at 562, 488 P.2d at 30-31, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 726-27
90. Guardian Loan Co. v. Baylis, 112 NJ. Super. 44, 270 A.2d 304 (Dist. Ct. 1970);
Consumer Credit Corp. v. Lewis, 63'Misc. 2d 928, 313 N.Y.S.2d 879 (Dist. Ct. 1970).
See also Brief for Defendant-Appellant, Associate Loan Co. v. Imperiale, CCH [1968-
1,972 Transfer Binder] Pov. L. REP. 12,754 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1970).
91. 44 Wis. 2d 712, 172 N.W.2d 20 (1969). See also Leary v. Heard, CCH Pov. L.
REP. 11,199 (Alameda, Cal. Mun. Ct., 1969) (order discharging attachment). But -cf.
Michaels Jewelers v. Handy, 266 A.2d 904 (Conn. Cir. Ct. 1969) where a court affirmed
the view that wages were distinguishable from other kinds of property since the state
legislature had provided separate statutory provisions for the attachment of wages and
all other property respectively
92. 44 Wis. 2d at 718, 172 N.W.2d at 23. In Gerovac v. Heibar Trucking, Inc., 43
Wis. 2d 328, 344 n.5, 168 N.W.2d 863, 866 n.5 (1969), the Wisconsin Supreme Court
again spoke of Mr. Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in the Smadach case: "The
writer, for himself only, concludes that the garnishment action here involved might sur-
vive the majority decision, but would be torpedoed by the logic of the concurring
opmuon."
1972]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
The same approach was indicated in Jones Press, Inc. v. Motor Travel
Services, Inc.,93 where the Supreme Court of Minnesota held a state
statute unconstitutional because it authorized prejudgment garnishment
of accounts receivable without provision for notice or hearing. THe
court asserted the hardship and mustice in prejudgment garnishment of
wages was equally applicable to the laborer, artisan or merchant, whose
livelihood depended on selling his services or goods. The court con-
cluded:
[T] he fortuity of a debtor's, being self-employed should not insu-
late a creditor from according the debtor procedural due process.
If the wage earner is entitled to prior notice and an opportunity to
be heard, no reason occurs to us why the corner grocer, the self-
employed mechanic, or the neighborhood shopkeeper should have
his income frozen by the garnishment of his accounts receivable
prior to the tine his liability is established. 94
The Minnesota court, however, disregarded the fact that the proverbial
"corner grocer" was not the party before it, but rather a person with
an apparently substantial business, having at the time of the case at
least $22,000 in receivables. 5 Furthermore, the debtor in Jones was also
able to post a $65,000 bond to avoid additional garnishments. "6 Although
the Smadach rationale should logically apply to a merchant who would
in fact be deprived of essential supports of life by attachment of receiv-
ables, this factor is apparently absent in Jones.97 Consequently, if the
Smadach decision was based on a rationale of protecting only that
specialized type of property necessary for human sustenance, then in
this instance its ruling should not be controlling. But what this court
93. 286 Minn. 205i 176 N.W.2d 87 (1970). See also Arnold v. Knettle, 10 Ariz. App.
509, 460 P.2d 45 (Ct. App. 1969), where the defendant garnished receivables due the
plaintiff after plaintiff defaulted on a $1,700 note given to defendant as part of a partner-
sup agreement. But see American Olean Tile Co. v. Zimmerman, 317 F Supp. 150 (D.
Hawaii 1970), where a court has held Hawaii garnishment law [HAwAii REv. STAT.,
S 652-1 to -15 (1968)] properly applicable to the prejudgement garnishment of a cor-
poration's checking account, its payroll account, and payments due it on completed
contracts. The corporation's checking and payroll accounts totalled $9,800, and the
receivables amounted to $11,900. 317 F Supp. at 150.
94. 286 Minn. at 200, 176 N.W.2d at 90.
95. Id. at 207, 176 N.W.2d at 89.
96. Id.
97. An Arizona court has distinguished receivables as simply "not wages" under a
literal reading of Smadacb. Andrew Brown Co. v. Panter's Warehouse Inc., 11 Arz.
App. 571, -, 466 P.2d 790, 791 (Ct. App. 1070). Once again essentially commercial
interests were at stake.
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recognized, as did the courts in Randone and Larson, was that Smadach
was decided on due process grounds rather than on some notion of
unconscionability,98 and, therefore, its application should not be so
limited. Whether it be the unemployed workman of Randone or the
merchant of Jones, it is the hearing which is significant.
No less repugnant to the mandates of the Sniadacb decision are the
hardsips caused an indigent tenant by the use of various landlord
distraint laws. 9 If a landlord is virtually granted a license to impound
essential chattels, no matter how trivial the claim, basic human needs
may be irreparably affected. Accordingly, such laws also have come
under judicial scrutiny.
In Klim v. Jones,00 a federal district court held a California Inn-
keepers Lien Law1m constitutionally invalid insofar as it allowed a hotel
keeper to detain a painter's working tools, his personal clothing, and
other personal effects,1 2 'all for the claimed deficiency of five dollars
in rental payments. 0 3 Finding the statutory procedure permitting such
arbitrary seizure "at least as destructive if not more so than pre-
judgment garnishment,"' 04 the court struck it down when used to
deprive the debtor of property "which is his means of employment and
support." 'Or Indeed, the Klim court found that the innkeepers' statutory
lien struck with even greater impact than had the Wisconsin garnish-
ment statute in Snmadacb.10
98. See, e.g., Randone v. Appellate Dep't, 5 Cal. 3d 536, 488 P.2d 13, 96 Cal. Rptr.
,709,(1971)- "Smadach does not mark a radical departure mn constitutional adjudication.
it is not a rivulet of wage garnishment but part of the mainstream of past procedural
due process decisions of the United States Supreme Court." Id. at. 550, 488 P.2d at 22,
96 Cal. Rptr. at 718.
99. See, e.g., Tax. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5238a (Supp. 1969). This statute was
declared unconstitutional under the "narrowly" drawn test enunciated in Snmadach.
Hall v. Garson, 430 F.2d 430 (5th Cir. 1970).
100. 315 F Supp. 109 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
101. CAL. Civ. CODE S 1861 (West 1964).
102. These included an electric -frying pan, a coffee pot, a lamp and the painter'a
bank book.
103. 315 F Supp. at 111.
104. Id. at 122.
105. Id. at 115. See also Yazzie v. Longiro, [1968-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH Pov.
L. REP. 12,267, (N.M. Dist. Ct. 1970) (complaint and temporary restraining order
filed Sept. 4, 1970) (sole means of transportation to and -from one's, place of employ-
ment considered "tool of trade," and therefore taking was without due procesa of
law).
-106. 31 F Supp. at 122-23. The court noted several ways in which Klm suffered
greater hardships as a result of the prejudgment procedure than did Mrs. Smadach:
(1) Persons habituating "rooming facilities of lesser light" have "no steady or signifi-
cant source of income, much less regular wages."
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I Similarly, the distraint procedures of the Pennsylvania Landlord and
Tenant Act'07 came under constitutional attack in Santiago v. McEl-
roy. 08 The Santiago's, who were public welfare recipients with no
savings, had had much of their property distrained by the landlord
pursuant to statutory procedures. The court noted that the remedy of
distress was age old; as encrusted in the Act, it allowed the landlord,
whenever he concluded that rent was due and owing, to distrain all
non-exempt property on the tenant's premises and to have it sold at
public sale if no replevin action was instituted by the tenant within a
live day period. The court found the case to be indistinguishable from
Smadach, and concluded that the deprivation of the goods would
amount to a "grievous loss" to the indigent tenants. 19 Although cer-
tam property was statutorily immune from levy and sale, the court
determined that these exemptions were not sufficient to lighten "the
impact of the loss in a substantial manner." 110
To the indigent debtor, replevin is no less opprobrious than garnish-
ment or attachment. A creditor utilizing this procedure can have a
.peace officer seize specified property from an allegedly defaulting debtor
prior to any formal adjudication of the creditor's claim."' The poten-
tiality for harm to the indigent is obvious. Before such a deprivation
takes place, however, prior notice and hearing must now be afforded."12
(2) The innkeeper's lien applied to virtually all kinds of property, and was not
subject to any percentage limitations.
(3) Because the procedure could deny the boarder accesq to the tools of his trade,
it could result in the loss of his job, and perhaps in the loss of professional good will
as well.
(4) The lien might result in "dubious or fraudulent claims being paid by the harried
boarder with valid legal defenses being relegated to the dustbin." Id.
107. PA. STAT. AN. nt. 68, § 250-302 to -313 (1951).
108. 319F Supp. 284 (ED. Pa. 1970).
109. Id. at 294.
110. Id. For recent attacks on other landlord distraint laws, see MacQueen v.
Lambert, [1968-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH Pov. L. REP. 12,735 (M.D. Fla. 1970)
(tenants of mobile home evicted late at night by landlord and sheriff who forced them
to leave all their belongings allege a violation of their civil rights; motion to dismiss
denied). But of. Parker v. Pleasant Realty Co., 273 A.2d 486 (R.1. 1971) (landlord held
to have right to repossess and remove property left in premises where tenant has aban-
doned them and the monthly rental was greater than 15 days in arrears)
111. See, e.g., MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 565.01 (Supp. 1972).
112. Fuentes v. Shevin, 92 S. Ct. 1983 (1972). See also Blair v. Pitchess, 5 Cal. 3d 258,
4.86 P.2d 1242, 96 Cal. Rptr. 42 (1971), in which California's claim and delivery law,
which permitted the sheriff to break in and-take possession of personal property without
prior nonce to a debtor and without affording him an opportunity to be heard, was
held violative of the fourth and fourteenth amendments.
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Replevin procedures have only recently come under attack.'13 In
Ltrprease v. Raymours Furnture Co 114 .a three judge federal pahel n
New York invalidated a state replevin statute"6 which permitted pier
hearing seizure of property as violative of due process under the four-
teenth amendment."' Mrs. Laprease, a welfare recipient responsible
for the care of her incapacitated husband and ten children, alleged that
she was unable to replace the goods seized, and that pretrial seizure of
these items would cause irreparable injury The court recognized the
hardship involved in the seizure:
Beds, stoves, mattresses, dishes, tables and other necessaries for
ordinary day-to-day living are, like wages in Snadach, a "special-
ized type of property presenting distinct problems in our economic
system," the taking of which on the unilateral command of an ad-
verse party "may impose tremendous hardships" on purchasers of
these essentials. Lack of refrigeration, cooking facilities and
beds create hardships, it would seem, equally as severe as the tem-
porary withholding of Y2 of Smadach's pay, and measured by
Snadach the hardships imposed cannot be considered de minns.117
At first glance, the court appears to have extended the rationale of
Snadach. While Snmadach was concerned with a deprivation which was
a practical matter "might drive a wage earner below poverty level," I's
this court recognized a right to an existence more meaningful than mere
113. See, e.g., Epps v. Cortese, 326 F Supp. 127 (E.D. Pa. 1971); Blair v. Pitchess
5 Cal. 3d 258, 486 P.2d 1242, 96 Cal. Rptr. 42 (1971). See also, Jernigan v. Economy
Exterminating Co., 327 F Supp. 24 (ND. Ga. 1971), which involves a challenge to
the Georgia bail trover statute. GA. CODE ANN. § 107-201 et seq. (Supp. 1971). This
statute combines the element of replevin and jail. If after a creditor swears out an
affidavit alleging that he owns property, and the debtor is illegally Tetaming it, -the
sheriff is" required to go out and bring 'back either the property, a bond in double the
value of the property, or the alleged debtor umselfwho could be jailed for up to
five days without a hearing, Here the court held that such statute was narrowly
drawn to meet the Smadach "extraordinary circumstances" requirements.
.114. 315 F Supp. 716 (N.D.N.Y. 1970). (The case of La'wson, v. Galvin was conqoli-
dated with Laprease.) But see Wheeler v. Adams Co., 322 F Supp. 645 (D. Md. 1971),.
(Maryland replevm statute was upheld against due process attack, on the-b~sis tha it
provided for a showing by the creditor of a prima facia case).
115. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. §§ 7101-7111 (McKinney 1963).
116. Mrs. Laprease also contended that it was violativeof the-fourth and fourteenti
amendments, m that it provided for a search and seizure without a warrant and that
it was violative of the equal protection clause because of- the bond requirement necessary
'to reacquire.seized chattels. 315 F Supp. at 720.
117. Id. at 722-23.
118. 395 U.S. at 341-42.
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subsistence.119 But logically the effect of Laprease has been to linmt the
Snmadach holding. Smadach was concerned broadly with due process
and made no distinction as to the type of property seized. Although
this court misread the scope of the Smadach holding, it clearly recog-
nized the policy determination which led to the decision-the equaliza-
uon of the relative positions of debtor and creditor.
Two months after the decision in Laprease, Florida's replevin statute
came under similar attack in Fuentes v. Faircloth.20 This court, how-
ever, reached a substantially different result.121 The plaintiff had pur-
chased a gas stove and service policy from the Firestone Tire and
Rubber Company, pursuant to which she signed an installment sales
contract which included the right of repossession in the seller "in the
event of default of any payment. ",122 Several months later she pur-
chased a stereo from the same company under a similar contract. After
making installments for more than a year, a dispute arose over the
servicing of the stove, at which point Mrs. Fuentes stopped payment.
In conformance with Florida statutory procedure Firestone obtained a
writ of replevin ordering the sheriff to seize the disputed goods. 28
Relying on Brunsvwck v. J&P, Inc., 21 which did not involve a con-
sumer debtor, but did involve enforcement of a security interest by
one commercial party against another,'125 the court concluded:
there are still situations in which prejudgment seizure of goods
without a prior hearing is valid and replevin pursuant to
a contract which authorizes a conditional seller to repossess in
order to protect his security interest is one of those situa-
tions.
2 6
119. Cf. Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term-Forward: On Protecting the
Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. tRnv. 7, 13 (1969)" "[A] claim to
"mmnmum protection" would mean that persons are entitled to have certain wants
satisfied-certain existing needs filled-by government. "
120. 317 F Supp. 954 (S.D. Fla. 1970), rev'd sub nom, 92 S. Ct. 1983 (1972).
121. This court also rejected a fourth amendment argument, since it considered the
contractual right of repossession determinative of the issue.
122. 317 F Supp. at 956.
123. FLA. STAT. ANor. S 78.01 to .21 (1972).
124. 424 F.2d 100 (i0th Cir. 1970). The Laprease court distinguished Brunswick on
the basis that the defendants in that case had admitted they were in default at the
time of the suit. 315 F Supp. at 724.
125. The Court said the difference between consumer and purely commercial con-
tracts was "a distinction without a difference as far as Due Process is concerned." 317
F Supp. at 957.
126. Id. at 958.
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By holding that the plaintiff had contracted away her constitutional
rights, the court avoided the issue raised in Sniadach. The Uniform
Commercial Code provides that "[u]nless otherwise agreed a secured
party has on default the right to take possession of the collateral." 127
The implication was that the debtor, by entering into an agreement
placed herself on notice of the consequences of failure to perform, and
thereby waived her constitutional rights. This of course is an unsatis-
factory approach to the problem, since the hardship on the consumer
debtor is no less than that which flows from other prejudgment proce-
dures. Considering the relativ_ bargaining power of the two parties,
it is reasonable to assume that often the contract signed is a standard
form which includes such clauses. 28
Both Laprease and Fuentes presented situations which involved an
element not present in Sniadach-that of a contractual provision allowing
repossession by the seller. Ignoring the relative bargaining power of
the two contracting parties, the Fuentes court determined that such a
contractual provision took the case beyond the scope of Sniadach.
129
Mrs. Fuentes ought not "be heard to object to the default procedure
[she] agreed to." 130
The Laprease court, however, recognized that the policy determina-
tion made by Sniadach involved an examination of the economic reali-
ties and abuses inherent in the unequal bargaining position of the low-
income debtor and the creditor. It therefore questioned whether
".. . the fine print in the usual consumer conditional sales contract
gives rise to a competent and intelligent waiver of a constitutional
127. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-503.
128. A California court has invalidated section 9-503 of the California Commercial
Code, which authorized creditors to take possession and dispose of a defaulting debtor's
collateral without judicial process. The Court ruled that it operated to deprive a con-
sumer, who of necessity must accept the terms of a standard form adhesion contract,
of property without notice and an opportunity to be heard in violation of the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Brunswick was distinguished on several
grounds. One distinction was that Brunswick involved the repossession of bowling
equipment. "The subjects of secured transactions are commonly household appliances,
furniture, and automobiles, all of which may be considered necessaries for ordinary
day-to-day living. Consequently for this reason also, the statutes in issue fail to meet
the test of narrowness established by Sniadach." Adams v. Egley, 338 F. Supp. 614, 621
(S.D. Cal. 1972).
. 129. The court noted the series of cases extending the Sniadach holding beyond,
wage garnishment, but concluded: "We do not think any of these cases affect the
result we reach on the Due Process issue because none deal with the enforcement of
a security interest pursuant to a contract provision authorizing it." 317 F. Supp. at 959.
130. Id. at 957, citing the language of the court in Brunswick Corp. v. J & P, Inc.,
424 F.2d 100, 105 (10th Cir. 1970).
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right." 131 It can be argued that Smadach recognized that the Wisconsin
prejudgment wage -garnishment statute, although not specifically in-
cluded as a term of the contract, was most certainly a product of. the
so called freedom of contract. In effect, then, what that statute did was
to superimpose a default provision on the contract. 3 2 As such, the
approach to the situation presented in Laprease ought not to be sig-
nificantly different.'33
Fuentes v. Shen
Much of the confusion in the courts was abated when the Supreme
Court rendered its opinion in Fuentes on appeal. 134 Essentially the
Court answered three questions. First, it held that the Florida pye-
judgment replevin procedure was constitutionally defective in failing to
pr vide for notice and a hearing "at a meaningful time." "5 Second, it
held that the inclusion of a standard "right to possession clause" does not
constitute a waiver of the due process right to notice and a hearing. 36
Third, the Supreme Court laid to rest any lingering doubts that the
Snzadacb mandate concerned only "necessities" such as wages or "essen-
tial" property mterests.lar
Mr. Justice Stewart, speaking for the Court, recognized that pre-
judgment replevin, like prejudgment wage garnishment, was a develop-
ment of the twentieth century Although its roots can be traced to
the common law action of replevin, the modern prejudgment replevin
statute bears very little resemblance to its common law ancestry 128
131. 315 F Supp. at 724.
132. It is an old legal maxim that everyone is presumed to know the law. Therefore,
the statute rnvolved was just as much a part of the contract as it would have been had
the clause not been included.
133. Perhaps the major obstacle to this type of analysis is the fourteenth amend-
ments requirement of state action. However, as the construction of state action ex-
pands to include "conduct under color of state law" or "private conduct serving a
state purpose" it would seem that this bar mght not long remain an obstacle. See
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 US. 1 (1948); Note, 66 Nw. U.L. Rv. 502, 512-15 (1971).
134. Fuentes v. Shevin, 92 S. Ct. 1983 (1972). The Court heard Fuentes in conjunc-
tion with a compamon case, Parkham v. Cortese, 92 S. Ct. 1983 (1972). This case in-
volved a challenge to the Pennsylvania prejudgment replevin process.
135. 92 S. Ct. at 1994. There was also a challenge to the prejudgment replevin pro-
cedure under the fourth amendment, made applicable to the states by the fourteenth
amendment. The Court, however, did not reach thig issue.
"" 136. Id. at 2002.
137. Id. at 1998.
138. Id. at 1993-94.
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Such statutes have come to be used almost exclusively "by creditors to
seize goods allegedly wrongfully detained by debtors." 139
In Florida, any person who alleged that his "goods or chattels are
wrongfully detained by any other person or officer" could, upon the
filing of such allegations, ex parte "have a writ of replevin to recover
them." 140 The writ issued automatically, and there was no provision
for notice to the dispossessed or a prior hearing to determine the validity
of the claim asserted. 41
Echoing Snmadach, the Court found that a "temporary, nonfinal
deprivation of property is nonetheless a 'deprivation' in the terms of
the Fourteenth Amendment." 142 It is the intent of continued possession
and use of the goods which is of sufficient importance to require con-
stitutonal protection. Therefore, in order for a seizure to be made, an
individual must be afforded "an opportunity for a hearing before he is
deprived of any significant property interest "7 143
The lower court was not unmindful of the Sniadacb holding, but
nevertheless had denied Mrs. Fuentes' constitutional claim on the
grounds that the goods seized from her were not deserving of due
process protection. "Smadach expressly was a unique case involving a
special type of property." 144 The Supreme Court rejected such .a re-
strictive reading of Smadach and, with its rejection, shattered the belief
that Smadacb was a new formulation.145 The Court in Fuentes observed
that Snmadach marked no radical departure from established due process
principles. Its decision was in the "mainstream of past cases having little
or nothing to do with the absolute 'necessities' of life but establishing
that due process requires an opportunity for a hearing before a depriva-
tion of property takes effect." 14
[W]hile Snadach emphasized the special inportance of
wages [it] did not convert that emphasis into a new and
more lirmted constitutional doctrine.
139. Id, at 1993.
140, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 78.01 (1964).
141. A total of 30 states have substantially the same replevm statute as Florida, aui
thorizing summary prejudgement replevm without notice or hearing. Brief for M.
Fuentes as Amicus Curiae, 92 S. Ct. 1983 (1972).
142. 92 S. Ct. at 1996.
143. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378-79 (1971).
144. 317 F Supp. at 957 [Citing Brunswick Corp. v. J & P, Inc., 424 F.2d 100, -105
(i0th Cir. 1970) 1.
145. 92 S. Ct. at 1998-99.
146. Id. at 1998.
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No doubt, there may be many gradations in the "importance"
or "necessity" of various consumer goods. Stoves could be com-
pared to television sets, or beds could be compared to tables. But if
the root principle of procedural due process is to be applied with
objectivity, it cannot rest on such distinctions. The Fourteenth
Amendment speaks of "property" generally And, under our free
enterprise system, an individual's choices in the marketplace are
respected, however unwise they may seem to someone else. It is
not the business of a court adjudicating due process rights to
make its own critical evaluation of those choices and protect only
the ones that, by its own lights, are "necessary" 147
The Court was not finished yet, however. The lower court had
determined that no matter what the scope of Smadacb, its rationale was
inappropriate because the parties had included a standard "right to
repossession clause" in their contract, and that was deemed controlling.
Recognizing that the terms of the contract were inextricably tied to
the economic imbalance of the debtor and creditor,r4s the Supreme
Court-rejected that ruling. In order to amount to a waiver of due
process rights, a clause must at least purport to be a waiver. The con-
tracts in Fuentes included no specific mention of waiver of notice or
prior hearing. "Rather, the purported waiver provisions here are no
more than a statement of the seller's right to repossession upon occur-
rence of certain events."' 49 Such general language was held insufficient
to waive Mrs. Fuentes' right to a preseizure hearing. Although by no
means dispositive of the question of waiver, the Court did recognize
that in order for a debtor to waive his constitutional rights there must
be something more than merely his signature on a standard form con-
tract.15 °
From the foregoing, it is apparent that the expansion of constitutional
guarantees into the area of civil litigation may presage fundamental
alterations in the debtor-creditor relationship. Perhaps the court is
dabbling in a bit of social legislation, but once it is accepted that due
process embodies principles of "fairness," and therefore judicial determi-
nation of what is fair, such intervention becomes more palatable.
147. Id. at 1999.
148. "There was no bargaining over contractual terms between the parties who, in
any event, were far from equal in bargaining power." Id. at 2002.
149. Id.
150. It hag been stated that in order for one to waive his constitutional rights it
must be done "voluntarily, intelligently, and knowingly" D. H. Overmyer Co. v.
Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 187 (1972).
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- The Supreme Court has determined "fundamentally fair" to require
that a debtor be provided notice and an opportunity to be heard before
a seizure of any sort takes place.151 But one must question: Is this
really what is meant?152 Does the due process clause only guarantee
notice and an opportunity for a hearing, without guaranteeing the hear-
ing itself? Indeed the Court's rhetoric has relied heavily on the "fair
process of decision making" which a hearing guarantees:
For when a person has an opporturnty to speak up in his own
defense, and when the State must listen to what he has to say,
substantively unfair and simply mistaken deprivations of property
interests can be prevented. 153
In the consumer context-particularly with respect to low-income con-
sumers-the mere guarantee of an "opportunity" could prove to be
meaningless. The efficacy of this constitutional protection will be de-
termined to a great extent by the facility with which it is allowed to
be waived or otherwise circumvented. If the "opportunity" for a hear-
inig can be signed away, it can be argued that little or no real protection
exists. 54 The more reasonable approach is to recognize that this con-
stitutional protection is waivable only when "fundamental fairness"
can be achieved without it. Otherwise the warning of Mr. Justice White
will indeed be a reality; the Court's rhetoric will be nothing but rhetoric,
and "the result it reaches will have little impact, and [will represent]
no more than ideological tinkering with state law" '5
CONSTITUTIONAL WAIVERS
Reference has previously been made to the spectacular post-war
growth of consumer credit. 56 The significance of this trend lies in the
151. See, e.g., Fuentes v. Shevin, 92 S. Ct. 1983, 1998 (1972); Boddie v. Connecticut,
401 U.S. 371, 378 (1971); Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313
(1950).
152. Mr. Justice Stewart indicated that was indeed what is meant. "For we deal
here only with the right to an opportunity to be heard. And, of course, no
hearing need be held unless the defendant, having received notce of his opportunity
takes advantage of it." 92 S. Ct. 'at 2000 n.29.
153. 92 S. Ct. at 1994.
154. "[Flor necessitous men are not, truly speaking, free men, but, to answer a
present exigency, will submit to any terms that the crafty impose " Umted States
v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 315 U.S. 289, 326 (1941) (Frankfurter, J, dissenting).
155. 92 S. Ct. at 2005 (White, J, dissenting).
156. See note 3 supra. See also 116 CoNG. REc. 33252 (1970) (remarks of Hon. John
Culver).
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fact that increasing numbers of individpals find their legal rights and
obligations governed by the terms of standard form contracts.15 7 Com-
mercial draftsmen, anxious to secure every legal advantage for their
clients, can be expected to substitute "private" remedies in place of the
statutory procedures which the judiciary has found to be constitutionally
infirm. Thus, it has been suggested that the Snzadacb prohibition against
prejudgment wage garnishment and the Fuentes decision concerning
replevin will be circumvented through the use of contractual wage
assignments58 or repossession clauses 159 executed in conjunction with
consumer loans and sales agreements. Once constitutional analysis is
brought to bear upon such "self-help" remedies, 160 the determinative
issue becomes waiver.
The classic definition of waiver is "an intentional relinquishment or
abandonment of a known right or privilege." 1' It is commonly stated
that a "heavy burden" rests upon the party who asserts the waiver of
a constitutional guarantee. 6 2  Courts "do not presume acquiescence
in" 1'3 and "indulge every reasonable presumption against" 1"4 forfeiture
of these fundamental rights. Such pronouncements are largely accurate
descriptions of standards applicable to the crimmail law'6 5 where waiver
analysis (and rhetoric) was pioneered. Laxity, however, has long been
the unfortunate tendency in the civil area where judicial permissiveness
can often be found masquerading under the guise of "freedom of con-
tract." 166
157. The poor are forced to rely exclusively on installment purchasing for the ac-
quisition of major durable items. D. CAPLOviTZ, THE PooR PAY MoiE (1967). But the
use of credit is not restricted to those persons unable to pay cash. A study conducted
in 1964 revealed that one-third of all individuals buying "on time" have accrued
savings sufficient to purchase the items outright. G. KAToNA, TiEM MAss CONSUMPTION
SociErY, 235 (1964).
Professor Caplovitz has remarked that while installment credit was once used to
sell merchandise, the reverse is now true. Merchandise has become a vehicle for the
sale of credit. Caplovitz, Consumer Credit in the Affluent Society, 33 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROB. 641, 644-45 (1968).
158. Young v. Ridley, 309 F Supp. 1308, 1312 (D.D.C. 1970)
159. See McCormick v. First Nat'l Bank, 322 F Supp. 604, 606 (S.D. Fla. 1971);
Fuentes v. Farcloth, 317 F Supp. 954, 959 (S.D. Fla. 1970), rev'd sub nom Fuentes v,
Shevin, 92 S. Ct. 1983 (1972).
160. This of course will depend on whether a narrow or expansive interpretation of
"state action" is adopted. See note 133 supra.
161. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
162. E.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1965).
163. Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 301 U.S. 292, 307 (1937).
164. Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 301 U.S. 389, 393 (1937)
165. See notes 172-75 infra & accompanying text.
166. This doctrine hag been strongly criticized as an anachromsm which condones
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The Supreme Court has confronted the waiver question in two recent
cases dealing with confessed judgments. The confession of judgment
is a legal device whereby a debtor authorizes "judgment to be entered
against him by his creditor, for a stipulated sum, by a written statement
to that effect or by warrant of attorney, without the institution of legal
proceedings of any kind ")167 The practice is of ancient origin18
and is commonly employed as a security device 09 m those few juris-
dictions which still permit its unrestricted use.170 By executing a war-
rant of attorney 71 the debtor necessarily waives his rights to notice
and a hearing,172 and upon entry, the judgment has the binding force of
sharp contractual practices. See, e.g., Issacs, The Standardizing of Contracts, 27 YALE
L.J. 34 (1917); Kesslr C 4cts _of_Adtaon-:Some Thoughts About Freedom of Con-
tract, 43 COLUm. L. REv. 629 (1943); Schuchman, Consumer Credit by, Adbesion Con-
tracts, 35 TEMP. L.Q. 125 (1962).
167. BLACK'S LAw DiCTioNARY 978 (rev. 4th ed. 1968). See -also Blott v. Blott, 227 Iowa
1108, 1111-12, 290 N.W '74, 76 (1940); O'Hara v. Manley, 140 Pa. Super. 39, 44, 12 A.2d
?20, 822 (1940).
168. References to the cognovit appear m 3 W BLA KsToNE, ComMENTARIES 397
See generally Note, Confessions of Judgment. 102 U. PA. L. REv. 524 (1954).
169. These clauses have been held to be security devices su6ject to disclosure under
the Truth in Lending Act. Douglas v. Beneficial Finance Co., 334 F Supp. 1166 (D.
Alas. 1971).
170. The overwhelming majority of cognovit judgments are entered in Ohio, Illinois,
and Pennsylvania. Hopson, Cognovnt Judgments: An Ignored Problem of Due Process
And Full Faith And Credit, 29 U. Cn. L. REv. 111, 115 (1961); Note, Cognownt Judg-
ments Under Fire In New York: Right Answer, Wrong Reason? 21 SYRACUSE L. REv.
197, 200 (1969); Note, supra note 168, at 524-25.
Most states have either abolished or restricted the use of this procedure. A short
summary of state law relating to judgment notes including pertinent statutory citations
can be found in 1 CCH CONSUMER CamiT GUIDE 610 (1969).
171. A typical warrant of attorney clause found in a recent Delaware opinion pro-
vides:
AND FURTHER, I or we, whether as maker or makers, or endorser or
endorsers hereof, do hereby, jointly and severally, authorize and empower
any Justice of the Peace in the State of Delaware, or elsewhere, with or
without process, to enter judgment, or any Clerk, Prothonotary or Attorney
of any Court of Record m the State of Delaware, or elsewhere, with or
without process, to appear for me, or us, or any of us, and to confess
judgment for the above amount against me, us, or any of us in the Superior
Court of the State of Delaware, or elsewhere, in the above obligation,
with legal interest, together with five percent (5%) of the amount of the
debt and interest as counsel fee and I or we do hereby jointly and
severally release all and all manner of error or errors in any such judgment
and execution issued or to be issued thereon. AND FURTHER, I or we
do hereby waive the benefit of any and all exemption laws of the State of
Delaware, or elsewhere
Osmond v. Spence, 327 F Supp. 1349, 1353 (D. Del. 1971).
172. D. H. Overnyer Co. v. Frick Co., 92 S. Ct. 775 (1972); RESTATEMENT (SEcONiD)
CONILicr OF LAWS § 25, comment at 112, § 32 comment g at 135 (1971).
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a jury verdict.173 The drastic character of the remedy'74 has been the
subject of critical commentary, 175 and courts usually give such authori-
zation a restrictive interpretation.76
The argument that cognovits are per se violative of due process was
rejected m D. H. Overmyer Co v. Frick Co.177 The disputed clause,
a warrant of attorney contained in an installment note, was executed
by Overmyer as part of a settlement of a preexisting obligation negoti-
ated by counsel of the two corporations. In return Frick agreed, inter
alia, to extend the date of payment under the original indebtedness, t6
reduce the rate of interest and to release certain mechanic's liens held by
it. Frick subsequently obtained a confessed judgment pursuant to an
Ohio statute,'1 and Overmyer, alleging a denial of due process under the
Ohio and United States constitutions, unsuccessfully appealed'79 the
denial of its motion to vacate the judgment.
On a writ of certiorari'80 the Supreme Court held unanimously that
the record clearly demonstrated a voluntary, intelligent and knowing
waiver of "the rights it otherwise possessed to prejudgment notice and
hearing. " "' The opinion strongly emphasized the participation of
legal counsel 82 in the transaction and the consideration received in
173. O'Hara v. Manley, 140 Pa. Super. 39, 12 A.2d 820 (1940).
174. In Cutler Corp. v. Latshaw, 374 Pa. 1, 4-5, 97 A.2d 234, 236 (1953) the. court
observed: "A warrant of attorney authorizing judgment is perhaps the most powerful
and drastic document known to civil law The signer deprives himself of every defense
and every delay of execution. .. [H]e places his cause in the hands of a hostile defender."
175. E.g., Hopson, supra note 170; Leary, Random Reflections on Remedies and Col-
lection in the Consumer Credit Field, 19 AM. U.L. REv. 189 (1970); Thornhill, Consii-
tutronal Questions Concerning Cognowit Notes, 1 DuKE B.J. 170 (1951); Developments
mn the Law-State Court Jurisdictiton, 73 HARv. L. Rnv. 909, 944 (1960); Comment,
Cognoit Judgments: Some Constitutional Considerations, 70 CoLUM.,L. Rzv. 1118 (1970);
Note, supra note 168.
176. See National Exch. Bank v. Wiley, 195 U.S. 257, 264 (1904); Peoples Banking
Co. v. Brumfield Hay & Grain Co., 172 Ohio St. 545, 179 N.E.2d 53 (1961); Elizabethtown
Lodge No. 596 v. Ellis, 391 Pa. 19, 137 A.2d 286 (1958); Frantz Tractor Co. v. Wyoming
Valley Nursery, 384 Pa. 213, 120 A.2d 303 (1956).
See also Atlas Credit Corp. v. Ezrine, 25 N.Y.2d 219, 226, 250 N.E.2d 474, 481, 303
N.Y.S.2d 382, 391 (1969) where full faith and credit was denied a confessed judgment
entered in Pennsylvania on the ground that such was repugnant to the public policy
of New York and not a "judgment in fact."
177. 92 S. Ct. 775 (1972).
178. Osno REv. CODF ANN. S 2323.13 (Page 1953).
179. No. 6552 (Ct. App. Ohio, Sept. 22, 1969), appeal dismissed for lack of a substantial
constitutional question, No. 69-720 (Ohio, Dec. 17, 1969).
180. 401 U.S. 992 (1971).
181. 92 S. Ct. at 783.
182. Id. at 780,782-83.
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exchange for the waiver.is 8 Clearly with consumer installment contracts
in mind, Justice Blackmun cautioned that:
Our holding, of course, is not controlling precedent for other
facts of other cases. For examplewhere there is great disparity of
bargaining power, and where the debtor receives nothing for the
cognovit provision, other legal consequences may ensue.1s 4
Swarb v. Lennox 85 presented the waiver of due process issue in a
consumer context. A class action"1 6 brought in the Umted States Dis-
trict Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvama8 7 challenged that
state's rules' and statutes 89 authorizing judgment by confession. Re-
lying on the testimony of individual complainants9 0 and a study of
confessed judgment debtors in Philadelphia and three other cities,191
plaintiffs sought to establish that few if any signers had knowledge or
understanding of the cognovit clauses contained in the conditional sales
contract. 92 The district court acknowledged that due process requires
notice and a hearing on the merits in the absence of a voluntary and
183. Id. at 780, 783.
184. Id. at 783.
185. 92 S. Ct. 767 (1972).
186. Plaintiffs purported to represent all:
[I]ndividual natural persons who are residents of the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania and who may be subject to execution of writs by the Sheriff
of Philadelphia County issued upon judgments entered under the acts or
rules challenged herein, or who have had such judgments entered against
them by the Prothonotary of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia
County under those acts or rules even though such judgements may
not have been so entered.
Swarb. v. Lennox, 314 F Supp. 1091, 1094 n.2 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
187. 314 F Supp. 1091 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
188. PA. R. Civ. P. 2950-76.
189. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 1482 (1953); PA. R. Civ. P 2950-76, amending PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 12, H§ 738-39 (1953).
190. See note 192 infra.
191. This 1968 study by David Caplovitz entitled Consumers in Trouble indicated that
only 4% of 245 Philadelphia judgment debtors studied had annual incomes exceeding
$10,000. Only'14% knew that the contract contained a confession of judgment clause.
314 F Supp. at 1097
192. Mrs. Doris Mims testified that she could neither understand nor explain the
meaning of the clause she had signed. The testimony of Mr. Thomas Veney, a detective
with the Consumer Fraud Division of the District Attorney's Office indicated that in
95% of the complaints he received regarding cognovits the debtor expressed "shock"
and "disbelief" when informed of the existence and legal meaning of the clause. An
officer of a consumer finance company testified that the only explanation given to
borrowers was that they were signing a "judgment note" 314 F Supp. at 1097-98.
'1972]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
understanding waiver, but chose to base. its decision 'solely on thenon-
fulfillment of the latter requirement.' It granted'relief to all Pennsy.-
vania residents with annual incomes of less than $10,000 who signed
consumer financing or lease contracts containing cognovit provisions,'94
thus'creating the rebuttable presumption that members of this-cl~ss do
- not understandingly and knowingly waive their rights when signing
such agreements. Since lack -of adequate representation precluded ex-
tension of relief to the class of signers earning in excess of $10,000 per
year,'95 the signatures of these Pennsylvania residents will continue to
be regarded as sufficient evidence of a valid waiver.
The Supreme Court left undisturbed' the district court's refusal to
extend its holding to home- mortgages or to persons with incomes
exceeding $10,000, but refused to reach any decision beyond this very
narrow point.'96 The majority viewed the defendants' failure to cross-
appeal '" as. a bar to further consideration of plaintiffs' other contentions
and hastened to add that affirmance did not imply that "[t]he District
'Gourt's opinion and judgment are approved' as to their other aspects and
details that are not before us." i98 Cohisonant with his Overmyer opinion,
Justice Blackmun felt constrained to supplement the holding with some
strongly-worded dicta. Revealing "some discomforture on our part
with respect to the present case," -19 he reiterated:
In our second concluding comment in Overmyer, we state
the decision is 'not controlling precedent for other facts of other
cases,' and we refer to contracts ofiadhesion, to bargaining power
.disparity, and to-the absence of anything received in return for, a
.cognovit provision. When factors of this kind- are present, we indi-
cate, 'other legal consequences may ensue.' That caveat has pos-
sible pertinency for participants in the Pennsylvania system.2 ° '-
Though reaffirming the familiar principle that constitutional guain-
193. Id. at 1100. ' -
194. Id. at 1098-99.
195. Id.
196. 92 S. Ct. 767, 772 (1972). ,
197. Only the plaintiffs appealed; subsequent to the district court's decision, the
Pennsylvania Attorney General's office declined to defend its state's procedure, agreeing
with plaintiffs' contention that it was invalid. Mr. Justice Douglas, protesting:that
'It is anomalous that an appellee by confessing error can defeat an appeal", would
have decided the issue of the constitutionality of the Pennsylvania statutes as applied
to consumers earning in excess of $10,000' per year. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 772-73.
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tees are subject to waiver, the Swuarb and Overmyer opinions express
concern lest a debtor's rights be wrested from him by overreaching
creditors. Frequent reference is made to contracts of adhesion201 and
lisparity of bargaining power.20 2 This is perhaps in recognition of the
fact that traditional theories of contract formation are largely irrelevant
to -modern day consumer experience. The common law of contracts
envisaged parties meeting on a basis of near economic equality2 03 It
was thought that the existence of sufficient alternatives would allow for
a process of shopping the market, negotiation, offer and acceptance.
Oppression was thus to be avoided, and the resulting "bargain" would
evidence a meeting of the minds.0 4
But common law precepts, grounded in the discarded economic doc-
trine of laissez faire,20 5 have not adapted to 20th century realities. The
pervasive use of standard form contracts206 accompanied by the develop-
ment of mass production and distribution techmques20 7 has eliminated
the "give and take" of consumer purchasing. Inequalities of bargaining
power are solidified by printed forms which "resolve all questions,
undecided to the contrary by statute, in favor of the dominant party" 208
As Frederich Kessler viewed the situation in 1943-
Standard contracts are typically used by enterprises with strong
bargaining power. The weaker party, in need of the goods or
services, is frequendy not in a position to shop around for better
terms, either because the author of the standard contract has a
monopoly (natural or artificial) or because all competitors use the
same clauses. His contractual intention is but a subjection more or
less voluntary to terms dictated by the stronger party, terms whose
consequences are often understood only in a vague way, if at all.209
That -a person is bound by what he signs can still be described as
201. Adhesion contracts are mentioned three times. 92 S. Ct. at 772, 782, 783.
202. Id.
203. Schuchman, supra note 166, at 135; Wright, Opposition of the Law to Business
Usages-, 26 COLum. L. REv. 917, 931 (1926).
204. See, e.g., 1 S. WILLISTON, CoNrRars § 18 (3d ed. 1957).
205. Kessler, supra note 166; Llewellyn, What Price Contract?-An Essay in Perspec-
tive, 40 YALE L.J. 704 (1931); Meyer, Contracts of Adhesion and the Doctrine of
Fundamental Breach, 50 VA. L. REv. 1178 (1964); Schuchman, supra note 166.
206. "The vast majority of today's 'contracts' are standardized forms " Meyer,
supra note 205; Tanner, Uniformity of judgment Notes in Pennsylvama, 44 Dicit. L.
REv. 173 (1940).
207. Meyer, supra note 205.
208. Schuchman, supra note 166, at 129.
209. Kessler, supra note 166, at 632.
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judicial dogma. 10 When, however, the condition sought to be imposed
upon the signer is a particularly onerous one, that seemingly rigid rule
occasionally yields to pronouncements of public policy,211 so-called
"back door" interpretive techniques,212 and, recently, the doctrine of
unconscionability 213
Although Overmyer speaks of "overreaching," 214 a purported con-
stitutional waiver should be voidable solely upon a finding of lack of
meaningful assent. Justice Blackmun hints that a contractual provision
which professes to divest one of his constitutionally protected rights
will require stricter inquiry into the knowledge and understanding with
which it was made than the law of contracts generally demands15 but
the Court's citation to National Equipment Rental Ltd. v. Szukhen9'
could be deemed inconsistent with this proposition.
In that case the Supreme Court upheld by a narrow margin a clause217
210. E.g., St. Petersburg Bank & Trust Co. v. Boutin, 445 F.2d 1028, 1032 (5th Cir.
1971); Brown v. Five Points Parking Center, 121 Ga. App. 819, 175 S.E.2d 901, 904
(1970); Maloney v. Oak Builders Inc., 256 La. 85, 235 So. 2d 386 (1970); Musser v.
Zurcher, 180 Neb. 882, 146 N.W.2d 559 (1966); Franklin v. Western Pac. Ins. Co,
243 Ore. 448, 414 P.2d 343 (1966). See also REsrATEMENT OF CONTRACTS S 70 (1932)"
One who makes a written offer which is accepted, or who manifests accept-
ance of the terms of a writing which he should reasonably understand to
be an offer or proposed contract, is bound by the contract, though ignor-
ant of the terms of the writing or of its proper interpretation.
211. The most noted example is Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358,
161 A.2d 69 (1960). But see Marshall v. Murray Oldsmobile Co., 207 Va. 972, 977,
154 S.E.2d 140, 144 (1967), where the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals refused to
follow Henrmngsen in a similar fact situation, stating: "We are loath to make such
abrupt changes in settled law and reluctant to declare invalid the formal undertakings
of parties for such vague reasons of public policy"
212. Courts have resorted to strained interpretation of unfavored clauses as well
as numerous other stratagems to defeat harsh contractual provisiong. See 1 A. CoRBIN,
CoirrRAcrs, § 128 (1963); Note, 45 Iowa L. REv. 843 (1960).
213. UNWOiR COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-302. See Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture
Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965); American Home Imp., Inc. v. MacIver, 105 N.H.
435, 201 A.2d 886 (1964); Lefkowitz v ITM, Inc., 52 Misc. 2d 39, 275 N.Y.S.2d 303
(Sup. Ct. 1966).
214. 92 S. Ct. at 782.
215. Id. at 781.
216. 375 U.S. 311 (1964) (cited at 92 S. Ct. 775, 782).
217. The provision read:
This agreement shall be deeme'd to have been made in Nassau County,
New York, regardless of the order in which the signatures of the parties
shall be affixed hereto, and shall be interpreted, and the rights and liabilities
of the parties here determined, in accordance with the laws of the State of
New York; and the Lessee hereby designates Florence Weinberg, 47-21
Forty-first Street, Long Island City, N.Y., as agent for, the purpose of
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by which a Michigan farmer "agreed" to appointment of an unknown
agent" in New York for receipt of process. By "agreeing" to such a
provision the farmer was deemed to have submitted to personal jurisdic-
non in that state. The provision, one of 18 paragraphs219 contained in
an equipment lease executed in Michigan, was found by the trial court
not to be of the fine-print variety.220 But, even assuming that the
Szukhents were cognizant of its existence, it is extremely doubtful that
the clause's purport or legal consequence was understood. Justice Black,
dissenting alone, forcefully made this point;z21 and Justice Brennan,
joined by Chief Justice Warren and Justice Goldberg, also protested:
It offends common sense to treat a prnted form which closes an
accepting service of any process within the State of New York.
Id. at 313 n.3.
218. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(d) (i) authorizes service of process to be made:
Upon an individual other than an infant or an incompetent person, by
delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to him personally
or by delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to an
agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process.
The appointed agent, it was later revealed, was the wife of one of the company's
officers. The Szukhentq had never met or dealt with her, and she received no compensa-
tson for the undertaking. 375 U.S. at 319 (Black, J, dissenting). The district court
found that no agency relationship had been established and, therefore, that no personal
jurisdiction over the defendant was obtained. National Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent,
30 F.R.D. 3, 4-5 (ED.N.Y. 1962).
The Supreme Court held that the fact that the summons and complaint were subse-
quently forwarded to the Szukhents validated the agency even though she had never
explicitly promised to do so. 375 U.S. at 316.
219. 375 U.S. at 313.
220. 30 F.RD. at 4.
221. Justice Black said:
This printed form provision buried in a multitude of words is too weak
an mutation of a genuine agreement to be treated as a waiver of so im-
portant a constitutional safeguard as is the right to be sued at home. Waivers
of constitutional rights to be effective, this Court has said, must be delib-
erately and understandingly made and can be established only by clear,
unequivocal, and unambiguous language. It strains credulity to suggest that
these Michigan farmers ever read these contractual provisions about Mrs.
Weinberg and about 'accepting service of any process within the State of
New York.' And it exhausts credulity to think that they or any other
layman reading these legalistic words would have known or even suspected
that they amounted to an agreement of the Szukhents to let the company
sue them in New York should any controversy arise. This Court should not
permit valuable constitutional rights to be destroyed by any such sharp
contractual practices. The idea that there was a knowing consent of the
.Szukhents to be sued in the courts of New York is no more than fiction-
not even an amable one at that.
375 US. at 332-33.
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installment sale as embodying terms to all of which the individual
knowingly assented. The sales pitch aims solely at getting the sig-
nature on the form and wastes no time explaining or even mention-
ing the print. Before I would find that an individual purchaser has
knowingly and intelligently consented to be sued in another State,
I would require more proof of that fact than is provided by his
mere signature on the form.22 2
The tone set by Swarb and Overmyer is clearly more compatible with
the National Equipment Rental dissents. It would seem that mere
knowledge of the physical presence of such a proviso is no longer suffi-
cient to validate a waiver. Its significance must also be appreciated. 22
But, it is yet unclear whether some vague idea of the clause's general
effect will suffice, or whether the party must perceive all of its legal
ramifications.2
4
Nor is one able to glean further insight from the Court's decision in
Fuentes.225 The conditional sales contract entered into by Mrs. Fuentes
contained a standard "right of possession clause." 226 The district court
intimated that at the very moment Mrs. Fuentes entered into such an
agreement, she, thereby waived all rights to notice and a hearing, and
authorized prejudgment attachment in accordance with the Florida
statutory scheme.22 The Supreme Court, as noted above, rejected such
a rationale. Making frequent reference to Overmyer, the Court reit-
erated the considerations relevant .in determining. the validity of a con-
tractual waiver of due process rights. Noting that the facts in the case
before it were a "far cry" from those in Overmyer, the Court observed:
222. 375 U.S. at 334. A similar clause was held unconscionable in Paragon Homes, Inc.,
v. Langolis, 4 UCC REP. SER. 16 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1967)
An analogous practice is the use of "inconvement venue." Often a business 'having
multiple locations within a state can sue a consumer in any county in which it has
offices, thereby inducing default. This much abused practice is common in New York.
See, Summnary of Hearings on Debt Collection Practices, National Commission on
Consumer Finance, 88 BANKING LJ. 291, 295-98 (1971) See also 115 CONG. Rac. 24513
(1969) (remarks of Hon. Seymour Halpern); DAVID CAPLOVTZ, THE POOR PAY MORE 161
(1967).
223. 92 S. Ct. 775, 782.
224. Although it was stated that Overmyer waived its rights to due process "with
full awareness of the legal consequences," there is no Indication whether this degree of
knowledge is a prerequisite to a valid waiver. Id. at 783.
225. 92 S. Ct. 1983.
226. The contract signed by Mrs. Fuentes provided that "in the event of default of
any payment or payments, seller at its option may take -back the -merchandise. "
227. FLA. STAT. ANN. S§ 78.01 et seq. (1964).
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- There was no-bargaining over -contractual terms between the
parties who, in any event, were far from equal in bargaining
power. The purported waiver provision was a printed part of a
form sales contract and a necessary condition of the sale. The
appellees made no showing whatever that the appellants were
actually aware or made aware of the significance 'f the fine print
now relied upon as a waiver of constitutional rights.22s
But again the Court felt no need to explore the "legal consequences
which would ensue" in such a situation. Instead, it was able to avoid
making any definitive statement by finding that a "right to pQssession"
clause, without more, does not contain language of sufficient clarity
to constitute a waiver of constitutional rights2 29
The Applicability of Criminal Law Precepts
-' The Overmyer opinion assumes arguendo that the standard for waiver
in civil cases may approach the strictness applied in criminal proceed-
ings. 230 On e might. doubt, however, that the parallels which were
drawn to ivelf-known criminal cases were meant to be taken literally
Is it necessary, for example, that one signing a cognovit have full aware-
ness of the. possible -defenses he may be relinquishing of the complete
range of consequences which could ensue, and-of.,"all other facts essen-
tial to a broad- understanding of the whole matter?" 231 -May a truly
effective and, intelligent waiver be presumed uress a purchaser is in-
formed of his rights under due process and advised that he may consult
- 228. 92 S. C at 2002.
229. Id,
230. 92. S. Ct. at 782. In Osmond v. Spence, 327 F Supp. 1349, 1359 n.28 (D. Del.
1971), the district court exhibited a willingness to indulge an opposite presumpuon
but added that '[E]ven in the civil field, the federal courts have insisted that such
evidence be of. a kind and degree aa to establish clearly and beyond- doubt that the
waiver was knowingly and intelligently, made." But see Ewing v. Mytinger & Cassel-
berry, 339 U.S..594 (1950) where the Supreme Court seemingly recognized a distinction
between civil and crimnal rights.
231. Cf. Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 724 (1948). Mr. Justice Black, joined
by Justices Douglas, Murphy, and Rufledge (there was no opinion- of the court),
stated that a waiver of right to counsel must be made with:
... an apprehension of the nature of the charges, the statutory offenses in-
cluded within them, the range of allowable punishments thereunder, pos-
sible defenses to the charges and circumstances in mitigation thereof, and
all other facts essential to a broad understanding of the. whole matter.
Although some courts have not considered this standard binding because it was not
supported by a majority, the Supreme Court in United States v. MCGee, 355 U.S. 17
(1957) (per',curiamf reversed a. criimnal convibtion apparently on the ground that the
defendant's waiver was made in ignorance of a possible defense. -
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with an attorney before signing? 1 2 And must an indigent be provided
free counsel?I
It might also be.questioned whether one can make an intelligent
waiver of the right to notice and a hearing with reference to facts
and circumstances yet unknown to him. Certainly a written waiver of
right to counsel or jury trial made several years prior to the bringing
of criminal charges would not be held enforceable. The Court in
Overmyer seems to anticipate and reject such an argument:
Overmyer may not have been able to predict with accuracy just
how or when Frick would proceed under the confession clause if
further default by Overmyer occurred, as it did, but this inability
does not in itself militate against effective waiver. 84
But in Fuentes the Court appears to retreat from this rationale:
The contracts included nothing about the waiver of a prior hear-
ing. They did not indicate how or through what process-a final
judgment, self-help, prejudgment replevin with a prior hearing, or
prejudgment replevin without a prior hearing-the seller could
take back the goods.23
There is force to the contention that an individual should not be allowed
to authorize future arbitrary action by another against him. This is
particularly true in the case of confessed judgments where the judg-
ment debtor must bear the burden of proof and expense in redressing
a wrongful use of the remedy
Likewise, if it be assumed that an intelligent and rational person would
not authorize a summary taking of his property, can such authorization
ever be said to be truly voluntary) Certainly a cognovit clause or a
replevin agreement which has been extracted as a result of extreme
economic duress would be invalid. The task of drawing lines becomes
difficult, though, when it is realized that voluntanness exists (or fails
to exist) not as an absolute but in varying degrees. Rarely, if ever, is
any decision made without reference to available alternatives, and the
relative desirability of these options dictates the choice.286
232. Cf. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
233. Cf. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 US. 335 (1963).
234. 92 S. Ct. at 783.
235. 92 S. Ct. at 2002.
236. Ghetto residents have been called "captive consumers" because of the absence of
meaningful alternatives. Lack of mobility and social pressures often restrict an indi-
gent's "market" to his immediate neighborhood. D. Con~oviiz, THE POOR PAY MoRF
49-80 (1967).
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The Court has gone to great lengths to insure that waivers in the
crimmal area are voluntarily made. It has.,been held that mere acqui-
escence to a search by uniformed officers is not sufficient consent under
the fourth amendment.ar" Under the fifth amendment one may remain
silent "unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own
will." 28 Although these and other decisions such as Miranda v. Art-
zona " were designed to eliminate physical and psychological compul-
sion in the police custodial context, their logic can be applied by analogy
to the civil area. The Supreme Court of California in striking down
that state's claim and delivery law, has held that retamed-title sales agree-
ments authorizing sellers to enter and repossess merchandise upon
default are invalid under the fourth amendment.240 The involuntary
nature of adhesion contracts was held to vitiate the waiver. Such rea-
soning has also been used to void written waivers of due process in
standard leases.24'
Perhaps a waiver is voluntary only when something tangible is given
in return. Justice Blackmun's frequent reference to consideration lends
credence to this contention. But it is difficult to determine, in the usual
consumer sales or loan contract, what, if anything, is given in exchange
for a waiver agreement. To assign some specific portion of the total
consideration to a particular clause would ignore the realities of the
consumer situation.
Is it suggested that courts inspect the adequacy of consideration (i.e.
the fairness of the bargain) in consumer financing arrangements? In
such case, reasonable commercial needs would appear to be a highly
relevant factor. Proponents of prejudgment wage garnishment, replevin,
and cognovits have long argued that inclusion of these devices is a
necessary condition to the extension of credit to high-risk consumers.
Without these security devices, they assert, credit could not be made
available to many who need it. This rationale has been discredited as
applied to prejudgment wage garnishment2 42 and its validity vzs-d-vis
replevin and cognovit clauses is questionable. The "privilege" of pur-
237. See Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968); Judd v. United States, 190
F.2d 649 (D.C. Cir. 1951); United States v. Shropshire, 271 F Supp. 521 (ED. La.
1967).
238. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 US. 1, 8 (1964).
239. 384 US. 436 (1966).
240. Blair v. Pitchess, 5 Cal. 3d 258, 486 P.2d 1242, 96 Cal. Rptr. 42 (1971).
241. Santiago v. McElroy, 319 F Supp. 284, 294 (ED. Pa. 1970).
24 Bruun, Wage-Garmshment m California: A Study and Reconmendatons, 53
ZR. 1av. 1214, 1239-43 (1965) But see Kriplte, Gesture and Reality in Conswner
Credit Reform, 44 N.Y.UJL. Rnv. 1, 34-37 (1969).
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chasing on credit should not be regarded as adequate consideration for
the relinquishment of a consumer's right to due process. Since Pro-
fessor Reich's article was published in 1964,243 the principle that gov-
ernment may not impose unconstitutional conditions upon receipt of its
largess, whether such be denomnnated a "right" or a "privilege," has
won judicial approval.244 Similarly, business interests should not be
permitted to "legislate by contract" 245 by exacting these same condi-
tions for the "privilege" of purchasing merchandise.
The effect of such an approach may well be to cause sellers and
lenders to be more circumspect in granting credit to high-risk con-
sumers. Or, lenders may simply raise the price of credit, where usury
laws permit, to offset any increased cost occasioned by absence of these
security devices. However, such a possible effect is no- defense to the
need, constitutionally compelled, to remedy the abuses which sharp
practices engender.
Standards for Determning Effective Waivers
As indicated above, the requirements of knowledge, intelligence and
voluntariness are often difficult to apply to specific fact situations. With
the exception of extreme cases, the difference between a voluntary or
involuntary, a knowledgeable or unknowledgeable, an intelligent or
unintelligent waiver, is one of degree rather than kind. Whether any
act can be said to be truly voluntary will depend on the absence of
243. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964). See also Hale, Unconstitu-
twnal .Conditions and Constitutional Rights, 35 COLUM. L. REv. 321 (1935); O'Neil,
Unconstitutional Conditions: Welfare Benefits vuth Strings Attached, 54 CAb. L. REv.
443 (1966); Note, Unconstitutional Conditions, 73 HAaiv. L. REv. 1595 (1960>.
244. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971); Goldberg-v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). See
also Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958);
Opp Cotton Mills v. Administrator, 312 U.S. 126 (1941); Goldsmith v. United States
Bd. of Tax Appeals, 270 U.S. 117 (1926); Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908).
But see Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971).
245. It has been suggested that unquestioning adherance to the principle of -freedom
of-contract allows dominant parties, in effect, to legislate through use of superior bar-
gaining power.
Society, by proclaiming -freedom of contract, guarantees that it will not
interfere with the exercise of power by contract. Freedom of contract
enables enterprisers to legislate by contract and, what is even more im-
portant, to legislate in a substantially authoritarian manner without using
the appearance of authoritarian forms- Standard contracts in particular
could thus become effectire instruments in the hands of powerful industrial
-- cnd vommercial overlofds-enibllng them to impose a new feudal order of
;-.thdir own-making upoir-a vast hos:of vassals.
Kessler, supra note 166, at 640. - . -,
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alteratives2 46 (real or imagined), and the individual's perception of the
situation. Similarly, inquiries into knowledge and intelligence necessitate
judicial probing into the subject's state of mind. The impossibility of
such a task compels a search for objective manifestations from which
a court can make a determination. A possible answer might be an
application of the objective theory used in the field of contracts to
ascertain whether a meeting of the minds has taken place. However,
as has been suggested previously, a constitutional waiver will require
even closer scrutiny, and all doubts should be resolved in favor of
non-waiver. Nevertheless, the courts can be expected to formulate some
readily discernible standard which, if satisfied, can be considered dis-
positive of these issues.
One available course is to establish classifications, assigning presump-
tions (absolute or rebuttable)-on the basis of class distinctions. This
approach was upheld in Swarb, although it i§ not clear whether the
Court intends to continue in this direction. By establishing a class of
persons whose membership is determined by income or some other -bjec-
tive criteria, and by raising a presumption that its members are incapable
of making a valid waiver, certainty will be injected into the law The
virtues of certitude, however, must be weighed against the need for
justice tailored to each individual situation. Unfortunately, the easier
and more arbitrary the classification the less likelihood there is that
any generalizations about it will be accurate. Such across-the-board
presumptions assume a homogeneity rarely found in any large group
of individuals. An income classification scheirie is particularly vulnerable
to citicism in this regard because of the two assumptions upon which
it proceeds.
The first logical underpinning of this categorization is that annual
income is a function of intelligence and education. As a general propo-
sition this correlation may have some validity, but deviations from this
"norm" are too commonplace to render a rule of law based upon it
logically defensible.41 The S'warb decision assumes further that formal
education can be equated with understanding of legal terminology
contained in a note or sales contract. It is submitted that the average
liberal arts major cannot be expected to understand the vocabulary
peculiar to the legal profession or the legal consequences flowing from
246. See note 231 supra.
247. US. Gov'T P= G OFFIC STATIsTcAL ABSTRACT OF THE UmTE STm-E. 1l,
312-13 (1971) indicates a defimte correlation between education and personal income,
but income levels vary videly from state to state andF within states.,, -.
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these masses of verbiage. The dubious legitimacy of these premises
lends an unacceptable arbitrariness to the classification-an arbitrariness
which would be shared by any scheme having as its basis a broad gen-
eralization applicable to great numbers of individuals under infinite
varieties of factual situations.
A second approach may be found in the Court's drift toward a con-
sumer-commercial distinction. Recognition that cognovits may "well
serve a proper and useful purpose in the commercial world" 248 coupled
with apparent discomfort over the Swarb holding adumbrates a possible
move in this direction. While classification on the basis of commercial
status appears eminently practical, its justification as a constitutional
standard would be somewhat difficult, as some of the courts which have
grappled with this problem have found. 49
A third alternative is the adoption of certain formalities which, when
complied with, become dispositive of the issue. Something akin to
Miranda warnings may in the future be deemed an absolute prerequi-
site to enforceable civil waiver.250 But requirements such as these fre-
quently degenerate into meaningless rituals long after their original
raison d'etre has been forgotten. The district court in Swarb indicated
that a statutory system of affidavits requiring the creditor to set forth
facts demonstrating knowledge and voluntariness might be constitu-
tionally acceptable.2 51 The possibilities for "rubber stamp" treatment,
however, render this suggestion undesirable from a consumer point of
view.
The most logical method of assessing the effect to be given an alleged
waiver is to examine each case, taking into consideration the facts and
circumstances peculiar to it. While affording basic fairness to both
parties, this approach imposes burdens of time and expense. Further-
more, if extended deliberation is to be expected on the issue of waiver,
its usefulness will be defeated. The purpose of summary action is to
allow a creditor to move quickly in order to insure security for his
claim. It is clear that lengthy proceedings on the waiver question would
offer no advantages over a full-scale hearing on the merits.
The most objectionable characteristic of any of the above alternatives
is the onus which would remain upon consumers to refute allegations of
248. 92 S. Ct. at 782. See also Leary, supra note 175 at 200, where it is suggested that
commercial interests must draft and sponsor statutes reinstating confessions of judgment
in a limited commercial context.
249. See text accompanying note 91 supra.
250. See note 233 supra.
251. 314 F Supp. at 1I00M01 n.24.
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waiver. Once a creditor is permitted to establish a prima facie case by
whatever standards are adopted, he can anticipate winning an over-
whelming percentage of these preliminary hearings by default.25 12 Many
merchants presently rely on the well-known propensity of low-income
consumers to default in civil actions. Rarely is it financially feasible
to miss a day's work or to hire an attorney to dispute a -minor clam. 253
Apathy, fear, and distrust of the legal system254 are also contributing
factors. While a resolution of this perplexing problem is beyond the
scope of the present discussion, it should be noted that expansions of due
process will be of little worth to those unable to avail themselves of its
protections.
UNCONSCIONABILITY AND DuE PROCESS
The logic employed in recent decisions extending the parameters of
due process bears a striking resemblance to that underlying the concept
of "unconscionability" embodied in Section 2-302 of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code. It is apparent that a constitutional formulation of un-
conscionability is evolving;2s and what is "unconscionable" is that
which denes an individual due process.
Section 2-302 of the Code provides that a court may refuse to enforce
a contract, or any clause thereof, which is found to have been uncon-
252. Of 107,943 civil suits filled in the Los Angeles Mumcipal Court in 1965-66, 39,765
resulted in default judgements. Note, Resort to the Legal Process in Collecting Debts
from High Risk Credit Consumers In Los Angeles-Alternative Methods for Allocating
Present Costs, 14 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 879-80 (1967).
Unscrupulous merchants rely heavily on default judgements, improper
service of process, repossession of property by marshalls, and the threat
of garnished salary by court order to compel a frightened consumer to
pay for unwanted merchandise.
115 CONG. Rtc. 24510 (1969). See also W MAGNUSON & J. CARPER, ThE DARK Sin- oF
TBE MARKETPLAcE (1953); Note, Abuse of Process: Sewer Service, 3 COLTJM. J. LAw &
SoC. PROB. 17 (1967).
253.It has been estimated that a nmmum $200 recovery is necessary to pay litigation
costs alone. Rice, Remedies, Enforcement Procedures and the Duality of Consumer
Transaction Problems, 48 B.U.L. REv. 559, 567 n.27 (1968). See also Comment, Trans-
lating Sympathy for Deceived Consumers into Effective Programs for Protection, 114
U. PA. L. REv. 395, 409 (1966).
254. D. CArLovrrz, THE POOR PAY MoRE 170-78 (1967).
255. In Hume v. United States, 132 U.S. 406, 411 (1889), the Supreme Court defined
an unconscionable contract as one "such as no man in his senses and not under delusion
would make on the one hand, and as no honest and fair man would accept on the
other . " However, one can hardly accept this statement as a workable defintion
of "unconscionability," much less elevate it to the level of a constitutional principle.
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scionable at the time it was made.25 As such, Section 2-302 merely
authorizes a court to take action which the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment compels.257
"Unconscionability" as a concept seems bereft of any concrete defi-
mtion.258 However, at a minimum it has been recognized to embrace
those situations where there is an absence of meaningful choice on the
part of one of the parties, coupled with a term or terms particularly
onerous to that party 259 A lack of meaningful choice is best exempli-
fied where there is a gross inequality of bargaining power, for when
one party lacks economic power or is unable to understand the terms
of the contract, the contract's "conscionability" becomes a matter of
grace with the stronger party, rather than a matter of negotiation.
Indeed, judicial rhetoric has tended to focus on the inevitable results
of an inequality of bargaining power.26 ° Whether viewed as a concept
of "unconscionability" or as a due process mandate, it is the mere
recognition that when there is bargaining power disparity "other legal
consequences may ensue" 261 which is of major sigmficance.
CONCLUSION
In essence the -Court has determined that it is "unconscionable" for
a debtor to be deprived of any significant property interest without
the protection of a hearing. This ruling suggests a recognition that a
hearing guarantees the "fair process of decision making" and provides
the modicum of protection needed when there is inequality -of bar-
256. If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the
contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court
may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder ,of
the contract without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the appli-
cation of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.
UNIwORM COMMERCIAL CoDx § 2-302 (1).
257. U.S. CoNsr. amend. XIV, § 1; "Nor shall any state deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law."
258. Professor Leff suggests that the doctrine of unconscionability is little more than
an authorization to courts to modify the law of sales in order to reach results which
are socially. desirable. Leff, Unconscoonability =md the Code-The Emperor's New
Clause, 115 U. PA. L. Rrv. 485, 558 (1967).
259. E.g., Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965);
Jones v. Star Credit Corp., 59 Misc. 2d 189, 298 N.Y.S.2d 264 (Sup. Ct. 1969)
260. E.g., Smadach-v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 341 (1969), citmg 114 CoNG.
Rac. 1832 (1968) (Remarks of Congressman Sullivan, Chairman of the House Subcbm-
mittee on Consumer Affairs). See also Swarb v. Lennox, 92 S. Ct. 767 (197-2); 1.1 H.
Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 92 S. Ct. 775 (1972).
261. Swarb -v. Lennox, 92 S. Ct. 767, 772-73 (1972).
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gaining power. Moreover, it evidences an understanding that without.
this protection the impoverished debtor is often incapable of helping
himself.
The policy of protecting certain classes of people who cannot ade-
quately protect themselves is by no means a new development of the
law 262 It is that policy which has led to the adoption of various dis-
closure263 and exemption statutes,26 and it is that policy which dictates
a constitutional prohibition of a contractual waiver of due process
protection. 265
As enunciated by the Court an individual may "waive the hearing
requrement of the due process clause" if it can be done "voluntarily,
knowingly, and intelligently" 266 Generally, however, allowing the
average individual to make waiver decisions is quite illogical. If it can
be assumed that an intelligent and knowing waiver is one made with
an understanding of all possible ensuing consequences,6 7 then it is
indeed doubtful whether any individual can fully comprehend the legal
ramifications of his act.268 The problem is further complicated when
one realizes that unlike the crimial situation, where there is a certain
imminency to a person's actions, the consequences of a contractual
262. It evolves from the old equity practice of aiding those who could not protect
themselves. See Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 YArs L.J. 454 (1909). E.g., Bartley v.
Lmdaberry, 89 NJ. Eq. 8, 104 A. 333 (Ch. 1918); Fitzpatrick v. Dorland, 27 Hun
(N.Y. Sup. Ct.) 291 (1882) See also Jones v. Star Credit Corp., 59 Misc. 2d 189, 191,
298 N.Y.S.2d 264, 266 (Sup. Ct. 1969), where the Court said:
The law is beginning to fight back against those who once took advantage
of the poor and illiterate without risk of either exposure or interfer-
ence. This body of laws [both statutory and common law] recognizes
the importance of a free enterprise system but at the same time will pro-
vide the legal armor to protect and safeguard the prospective victim from
the harshness of an unconscionable contract.
263. E.g,Fair Packaging and Labeling Act, 15 U.S.C.A. S 1451-61 (1966); Uniform
Deceptive Trade Practices Act, Ui4wOi LAws AN OTATED (Supp. 1965).
264. E.g., Moya v. DeBaca, 286 F Supp. 606 (D.N. Mex. 1968); Iowa Mutual Ins. Co.
v. Parr, 189 Kan. 475, 370 P.2d 400 (1962).
265. With regard to a general waiver of exemptions, the prevailing view is that
such is unenforceable as against public policy Annot., 94 AL..R.2d 967 (1964).266. D. H. -Overmyer Co: v. Frick Co, 92-S. C 75, 82T1972).
267. See notes 230-34 supra & accompanying text.
268. This is a proposition which has been repeated in the crimunal law. See, e.g,
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932), which noted:
The right to -be heard would be, m many cases, of little avail if it did
not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. Even the intelligent and
educated layman has small and sometimes no skill m the science of law.
If that be true of men of intelligence, how much more true is it of the
ignorant and illiterate, or those of feeble intellect:
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waiver are so distant that they are incomprehensible to the average
consumer.
It is even more illogical to allow a low-income consumer freedom
to waive his constitutional rights. For to do so is to presuppose a set
of values, motivation, and knowledge which simply are not present.
In order to understand his plight, one must be able to envision an in-
creasingly frustrated and embittered man with $10,000 desires, $5,000
essential needs, and a $2,000 income," 9 who, given the choice of credit
or no credit, will unhesitantly sign almost anything.2 70 It is therefore
apparent that in many cases professional legal assistance is a sine qua non
to a complete understanding of the consequences which flow from
such waiver provisions.
In conclusion, it is submitted that a contractual waiver is both uncon-
stitutional and unconscionable unless the waiver is made with the
assistance of counsel.Y If fundamental fairness is indeed the criterion,
and if what is fundamentally fair is that any debtor, before being de-
prived of any significant property interest have his day in court, then
it is improper to accept a waiver in any other circumstance. Moreover,
such a rule comports with those considerations which initially led to
the extension of due process principles to civil litigation.
As a practical matter, the effect of such a requirement would be to
eliminate the use of waivers in any consumer transaction. 72  Despite
infrequent suggestions to the contrary,2 73 it is doubtful whether the
indigent's right to appointed counsel will be a privilege afforded the
civil litigant. Since the low income consumer can ill afford a private
269. See D. CpLovrrz, THE PooR PAY MoaE (1967).
270. Since most low income consumers are unable to obtain credit in non-ghetto stores,
and cannot afford to make cash purchases, they are forced to deal exclusively with
ghetto merchants on whatever terms they set. See Note, Law and the Ghetto Con-
sumer, 14 CATH. LAWYER 214, 216-17 (1968).
271. One commentator has suggested that a stipulation signed by an attorney repre-
senting the debtor, that he has explained the clause's legal consequences should be an
absolute prerequisite to judicial enforcement of waivers. Leary, supra note 175, at 199-200.
272. It is assumed that lawyers will usually be involved in a commercial transaction.
273. In a recent decision, Argersinger v. Hamlin, 92 S. Ct. 2006 (1972), the Supreme
Court extended the right to counsel to petty offenses where the defendant's liberty is
at stake. In his concurring opinon Justice Powell suggested the possibility of extending
this right to civil litigants. Citing Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1970), he pointed out
that serious consequences may result from convictions not punishable by imprisonment.
He concluded: "When the deprivation of property rights and interests is of sufficient
consequence, denying the assistance of counsel to mdigents who are incapable of de-
fending themselves is a denial of due process." 92 S. Ct. at 2018 (Powell, J., concurring).
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attorney,2 7 4 it will be quite impossible for him to waive improvidently
his constitutional rights by contract. Even were the civil litigant pro-
vided sixth amendment rights, it is quite unrealistic to suggest that he
consult an attorney every time he makes a credit purchase.275 What
choice then is left for the merchant? If there is fear of a possible default,
he can either refuse to extend credit, or he can extend credit with the
recognition that his debtor will have the opportunity for his day in
court.27
This is by no means a total resolution of the problems of the poor
consumer. At best it is a stop-gap solution. There is no practical dif-
ference between pre- and post-judgment seizures unless judgment re-
sulted from an adversary hearing where both sides to the controversy
were fairly presented. Until the "have nots" of society become fully
incorporated into the mainstream of our system of justice, the effect of
these developments is likely to be minmal.
274. For example, the nummum fee schedule adopted by the Philadelphia Bar As-
sociaton indicates numnum civil practice fees of $25 an hour for preparing a brief,
$50 for attending a pre-trial conference, and $200 for each day rn court.
275. Since there are almost 200 million consumers in this country and only 335,200
attorneys, it is doubtful that the legal profession could withstand the upsurgance.
US. Gov'T P Nr NG Oi ciE, supra note 248, at 153.
276. For the low income market retailer there is no real choice at all. Since 93
percent of all his sales are made on credit, he either continues to extend credit or he
shuts his doors. ECONOMic REPoRT ON INsTALLMrNT Carr AND RETAIL SAry.s PRACTicas
oir Disrmar oF COLuMmiA RETAnas 5 (1968).
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